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1

Q.

I represent to you that was the

2

approximate month in which these two individuals filed

3

their grievance.

4

A.

Okay.

5

Q.

ThatTs the point in time ITm looking at.

6

Do you recall that?

7

A.

Okay.

8

Q.

I think there was another individual who

9
10

was a pharmacist who also filed a grievance named
Braithwaite.

Do you recall him, James?

11

A.

He was a pharmacist?

12

Q.

Yes.

13

A.

Yes, I do recall.

14

Q.

In fact, there's only one pharmacist in

15
16

the department, is there not?
A.

No.

I believe there is one in Draper, and

17

this one is in Gunnison part time, I belieye.

18

sure about that.

19

Q.

In response to his grievance did the

20

department provide for an administrative salary

21

increase of four steps?

22
23

A.

I'm not

I believe they did.
MR. NOLAN:

Excuse me.

Before you

24

answer that we'll object.

Mr. Braithwaite was

25

listed as a witness in documents with respect to
86

1

him supplied by grievants, and then I was advised

2

by counsel last week that they did not intend to

3

call him or refer to him in this matter.

4

object to any questions about Mr. Braithwaite, and

5

any response would be hearsay in any event.

6

MR. DYER:

We

Your honor, if counsels

7

understood I wasn't going to cross-examine, either

8

I misspoke or he misunderstood.

9

to call Mr. Braithwaite because Ms. Haymond was

I didn't intend

10

coming.

If he misunderstood, I apologize.

11

wasn't trying to mislead him.

12

and decided I didn't need him.

13

you, your Honor, I don't think it's hearsay

14

because it's an admission against interest in

15

terms of how the department treats various

16

employees.

17

JUDGE VALERGA:

I

I looked at my file
To be candid with

Well, in view that it

18

may qualify as an exception under the hearsay

19

rule, but hearsay is admissible anyway, so I will

20

receive it.

21
22

MR. DYER:
the record?

23
24
25

Did you get her answer on

(Answer read by reporter.)
Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

That was in response to my

I question that he had requested a four-step increase
87

1

and the department granted that request, did it not?

2

A.

Right.

3

Q.

And if I'm not mistaken that occurred

4

within the same time frame in 1998.

5

A.

I can't answer that for sure.

6

Q.

If I were to show you a document

7

concerning his personnel history, would that refresh

8

your recollection?

9

A.

MR. DYER:

10
11

Absolutely.
May I approach the witness,

your Honor?

12

JUDGE VALERGA:

13

MR. DYER:

14
15
16
17
18

Q.

23
24
25

Does that document refresh your

recollection as to —
A.

Yes.

It indicates he received an ASI in

July of '98.
JUDGE VALERGA:

I'm sorry.

I didn't

hear that.
THE WITNESS:

21
22

I'm not going to offer it.

I'm just going to refresh.

19
20

Yes.

He received an ASI in

July of 1998.
Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

And that would be have been

the four steps that we ta Iked about here, correct'p
A.

What?
88

1
2

Q.

here that he received.

3
4

The four steps that we've talked about

A.

It appears from this document that he

received seven steps.

5

Q.

Seven steps.

Thank you.

I f d ask you to look at Exhibit G-9, just a

6
7

quick moment.

These are documents showing there was

8

change in the salary range for these positions?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And in 1996 is when the IPC, the SS III

11

and the correctional captain became the current salary

12

range of 4 7 to 64; is that correct?

13

A.

14

Yes.
MR. DYER:

Your Honor, I move for

15

admissions of Exhibit G-6, G-7 -- excuse me -- I

16

forgot to offer 5 -- G-5, G-6, G-7, G-9, G-10 and

17

11.

18

JUDGE VALERGA:

19

MR. NOLAN:

Any objection?

Same objection as before,

20

Judge, with a couple of additional points.

There

21

is an argument as to relevance of anything that

22

happened before the grievance, particularly with

23

respect to the attachments to Mr. Dyer's letter to

24

I be long, which should date back to 1990, ten years

25

| before the date of the letter, and the question of

1

Q.

Okay.

Let's back up for a minute.

How

2

long have you been employed with the Department of

3

Corrections?

4

A.

September 4th of 1990 is my hire date.

5

Q.

And when you originally hired on, you

6

hired on in what capacity?

7

A.

Purchasing agent.

8

Q.

Were you subsequently promoted to an

9

accountant position?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And then from the accountant position what

12

position did you get promoted into next?

13

A.

To an IPC.

14

Q.

IPC as we've designated it here?

15

A.

Yes, institutional program coordinator.

16

Q.

Is that in April of f92, then?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

That's when you believe you became a

19

correctional captain; is that correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Since April of 1992 have you held a

22

position of SS III?

23

I

A.

Yes.

24

J

Q.

And how did you come to hold the position

25

I of an SS III?
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1

have been transfers other than, if you will, the

2

career mobility moves.

3

have been actually implemented by the department.

Those are the transfers that

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Now, the first page of Exhibit G-12, this

6

reflects what you believe are the inequitable

7

application of the salary ranges to your circumstances

8

vis-a-vis Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr; is that correct?

9

A.

Correct.

10

Q.

And the figures we have listed here for

11

June of '98, February of 2000 and April of 2001, to

12

the best of your knowledge those are dollar figures

13

that were obtained from the personnel records; is that

14

correct?

15

A.

Yeah, they're current as of that date.

16

Q.

There were some pay raises that we've

17

talked about here today that occurred in June of 2001

18

that aren't on this document; is that correct?

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

And it appears as we've looked at these

21

documents you're comparing yourself to Mr. Carlson and

22

Mr. Harr, that the dispari.ty between you and those two

23

individual.s has> increased over time.

24

A.

It has

25

Q.

And is it your contention that fs a result
109

1

of the fact that you have this inequitable application

2

of salary range to your circumstances?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

As I understand it, the relief you're

5

seeking in this matter is a four-step salary increase

6

retroactive to the date of your grievance.

7

A.

It is, sir, yes.

8

Q.

What is your educational background?

9

A.

I have a Bachelor of Science degree from

10

Brigham Young University in business management.

11
12

Q.

Do you know if Mr. Carlson or Mr. Harr

have an accountant's degree?

13

A.

Not to my knowledge.

14

Q.

When you were promoted to the position of

15

IPC, to your knowledge did it have the same salary

16

range in 1992 as the SS III and captain position?

17

A.

It did.

18

Q.

And has that been consistent throughout

19

the time —

20

A.

Yes

21

Q.

—

23

A.

Yes, it has.

24

Q.

Now, in this matter you also claim that

22

25

that you've held those positions?

I'm

sorry?

you have additional relevant experience that goes to
110

1

your position as captain.

Do you recall that?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Can you tell us briefly what that is?

4

A.

The time period between my hire date of

5

September 1990 to the time that I was promoted to a

6

captain would be looked at as what the Department of

7

Corrections would look at as relative

—

8

Q.

Relevant?

9

A.

Relevant.

10

Q.

Thank you.

11

A,

—

12

Q.

What you're talking is relevant experience

13

experience.

with the department.

14

A.

With the department.

15

Q.

As I understand it, you're claiming an

16

additional eight months of additional relevant

17

experience; is that correct?

18

A.

19

and accountant.

20

Q.

And prior to becoming an IPC.

21

A.

Right.

22

MR. DYER:

23

I have nothing further of

this witness, your Honor.

24
25

The time period I was a purchasing agent

JUDGE VALERGA:
I

Thank you.

Mr. Nolan.
Ill

1

just been told to replace a certain person in the

2

department.

3

leaves for Hawaii.

4

can't get out of leaving, but you have one hour to

5

take care of all the problems that reside in that

6

basket, and you go through that, and then there was an

7

interview process as well.
Q.

8
9
10

You have one hour before your plane
You spent all this money, and you

And as a result of that process did you

have an understanding as to whether or not you became
a captain?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

When you're talking about this process, is

13

that the captain promotional process you've testified

14

to?

15

A.

Yes, it was.

16

Q.

So is it your contention in this matter

17

that as of June of 1993 you became a captain?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

And that's consistent with the first page

20

of Exhibit G-12 where you show a grade date of June

21

'93, correct?

22

A.

Mine doesn't show '93.

23

Q.

The very first page.

24

A.

The very first.

25

Okay. Yes.

1

inequitable circumstance vis-a-vis you is Mr. Carlson,

2

correct?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Do you have a college degree?

5

A.

No.

6

Q.

I'm back to the typewritten page.

Let's

7

talk for a minute in terms of the positions you've

8

held since 1993, because it appears you ! ve been

9

transferred rather frequently.

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

It shows on June 18, f94 that there's a

12

transfer.

13

A.

Do you recall what that transfer was?
Yes.

It was actually a housing captain at

14

that time.

15

working title at that time was internal security

16

captain, and this one was a transfer to the housing

17

captain.

18
19

Q.

And when you say a housing captain, tell

us what that means.

20

A.

21

That means you're responsible for the

daily activities of an inmate housing unit.

22

Q.

23

Would that be similar to being captain

over the Elm unit?

24
25

When I was promoted to captain, the

I

A.

That's exactly the same.

Q.

So as of June of 1994 you've held a
129

1

captain's position over a unit.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And then in February of 1995 it appears

4

that there's a career mobility, and you became hearing

5

captain.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Then July of 1995 it appears there's a

8

transfer.

9

A.

I don't.

10

Q.

Does IDHO —

11

A.

I was the IDHO from February until March,

12

Do you recall what that was?

I believe, of '97.

13

Q.

What does IDHO stand for?

14

A.

Inmate disciplinary hearing officer.

15

Q.

So when you were the hearing officer

16

that's what you were, was the IDHO.

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q-

And after you became the IDHO, do you

19

recall what position you next held in terms of

20

transfer?

21

A.

22

I was transferred to an institutional

program coo rdinator ."

23

Q.

IPC?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And that would be on April of 1997?
130

1
2
3

JUDGE VALERGA:
Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

Go ahead, Mr. Dyer.
As you recall, there was

a meeting with Mr. Haun.

4

A.

Yes, there was.

5

Q.

Is that what you1re talking about, or are

6

you talking about a separate discussion?

7

A.

No, it was a meeting with Mr. Haun.

8

Q.

And why don!t you describe for us what

9
10

happened during the meeting with Mr. Haun.
A.

During the meeting he wanted to know our

11

issues of the grievance that we had filed and why we

12

felt like we had some action coming in that.

13

the course of the grievance we discussed other

14

occurrences that we felt justified something to be

15

done for us.

16

to court.

17

me anyway —

18

or whoever gives him his authority had given him the

19

responsibility to do ASIs to maintain equity, but they

20

did not give him the money to do that, and he was

21

desirous of somebody taking it someplace where they

22

would be forced to give that money.

23

Q.

During

Mr. Haun invited us to take this issue

It was his feeling -- that was projected to
it was his feeling that the legislature

So you understood Mr. Haun telling you to

24

go ahead and appeal it because that way he would be

25

forced to do it.
134

1

A.

Yes

2

Q.

Now, all of the transfers that you've

3

experienced as well as Mr. Burr, were those transfers,

4

at least of your understanding, approved by the

5

executive director of the department at any given

6

point in time?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Also, you've claimed in this matter

9

additional relevant experience, and like Mr. Burr I

10

assume that's the same time period, between your

11

initial hire date and when you became a captain.

12

that correct?

Is

13

A.

Yes

14

Q.

And like Mr. Burr I assume you're of the

15

same opinion based on the information you have, that

16

the positions of captain, SS III and IPC are

17

interchangeable with how the department has treated

18

you.

19

A.

My personal experience, yes.

20

Q.

And the relief you seek here is a

21
22
23
24
25

four-step increase effective as of May 1998.
A.

Yes.
MR. DYER:

I have no further

questions, your Honor.
JUDGE VALERGA:

Mr. Nolan, any
135
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151

Q.

1

The reason I ask is because there are some

2

very high numbers in these.

For instance, the total

3

UDC experience and also some very low numbers.

4

didn't do any sort of analysis in terms of whether or

5

not the mode or mean would be different.

You

6

A.

No,

7

Q.

And as you compare Mr. Burr, for instance,

8

with Mr. Carlson, your analysis on A-3 demonstrates

9

that he has more experience with the department, 154

10

months versus 140; is that correct?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And he has 8 9 months as a captain as

13

opposed to 62 months with Mr. Carlson?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And he is four steps lower in grade, is he

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Lower in pay.

19

A.

Wait a minute.

16

20
21

not?

I'm sorry.
Where are we here?

Yes,

four steps.
Q.

Earlier when counsel was talking with you,

22

he asked you about what could make a" difference in

23

pay, and some of the things you identified were salary

24

freezes.

25

anything suggesting other than this past year that

As I looked at the summaries I didn't see

190

1

there were any salary freezes from 1990 to 2000 that

2

would impact either Mr. Carlson or Mr. Burr.
A.

3

I don't know what years were salary

4

freezes.

5

could affect a person's salary.
Q.

6
7

That was just a general statement that they

So you didn't do any analysis ta determine

if that's the reason there was a difference.

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

As well as performance evaluations.

10

Did

you do any analysis to determine —

11

A.

No, I did not.

12

Q.

Okay.

And did you do any analysis to

13

determine if promotions had affected the difference in

14

pay between these individuals?

15

A.

The only thing I did as far as promotions

16

was did they get the steps that they should have

17

gotten under rule and policy for that promotion.

18

Q.

The reason I'm asking is -- if you would

19

look at Exhibit G-12 with respect to Mr. Carlson on

20

the typewritten page that you did.

21

A.

To Mr. Carlson?

22

Q.

Yes.

23

A.

Okay.

24

Q.

Now, I want to ask you a question real

25

quick.

As I was looking through the computer
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1

screens -- how far back do the computer screens go?

2

Do you know?

3

A.

I believe 1994 is when they converted.

4

Q.

Do you know when in 1994 by chance?

5

A.

I don't.

6

Q.

The reason I'm asking is because on

7

Mr. Carlson's, if you look on March 29th of 1994, we

8

have an entry there for a special adjustment

9

there's no clarification as to what it is -- of a

—

10

dollar and 50 cents an hour that he apparently

11

received while he was an SS III; is that correct?

12

A.

13
14

That's what it looks like.
JUDGE VALERGA:

Where is that line

again, Mr. Dyer?

15

MR. DYER:

If you go, your Honor, to

16

the G-12 and the typewritten page'for Mr. Carlson,

17

March 29th, 1994, there is an entry for a special

18

adjustment where Mr. Carlson's pay is raised

19

$1.50 an hour without explanation.

20

21

JUDGE VALERGA:

Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

Thank you.

Would you agree that over

22

the course of time when someone receives a pay

23

increase as a result of COLAs, moving up in merits

24

when you have a pay increase, for instance this one

25

of Mr. Carlson of $1.50, when you compare, they're
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1

this $1.50 special adjustment that Mr. Carlson

2

received apparently caused him to now be making more

3

money than both Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark.

4

A.

Apparently.

5

Q.

Now, your testimony was that in terms of

6

the individuals being hired at different rates, in

7

terms of different positions, was something that could

8

make a difference, as I understand it, in terms of

9

these individuals.

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Did you actually do any analysis to

12

determine whether or not it did make a difference?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Going back to A-3 for a moment, if I may.

15

When you compare Mr. Clark's months as a captain on

16

Exhibit A-3, he likewise has more months than

17

Mr. Carlson, does he not?

18

A.

Yes

19

Q.

122 versus 62?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And this apparently results —

as you look

22

at the career path of these three individuals, would

23

it be a fair statement to say that the pay differences

24

between Mr. Burr, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Clark

25

principally result from that special adjustment back
195

of A-2 somewhere there?
2

A.

No.

3

Q.

The rule.

4

A.

No, I don't.

5

Q.

You don't.

6

Then I'll share one with you.

How is that?

7

A.

Okay.

8

Q.

If you look at 477-6-11, the second page,

9
10

D, "The agency head or commissioner is the final
authority"

11
12

—
JUDGE VALERGA:

Just a minute.

Read

that slowly, Mr. Dyer.

13

Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

"The agency head or

14

commissioner is the final authority for salary

15

actions authorized within these guidelines.

16

agency head or commissioner or designee shall answer

17

any challenge of grievance resulting from an

18

administrative salary increase."

19

understand these rules, 477-6, the previous one, and

20

477-7 is that the department —

21

rule given this issue in terms of salary

22

compensation to agencies.

23

understanding?

24
25

A.

The

The way I

or DHRM has now by

Is that your

I'd hate to interpret DHRM's rules for

I them.
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Q.

1
2

You've been asked to do that this morning,

so I'm asking you to do it now.
A.

3

As far as administrative salary increases,

4

those are at the sole discretion of the executive

5

director of each agency or commissioner.

6

question?

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

Thank you.

9

Q.

And DHRM doesn't have any input on those.

10

A.

No.

11
12

MR. DYER:

Is that the

I agree.

May I have just a moment,

your Honor?

13

JUDGE VALERGA:

14

Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

Yes.
I just want to clarify

15

with respect to G-5, which is your e-mail to Daryl

16

Bell.

17

respect to that document, and you indicated that

18

your intent was simply to give Mr. Bell information

19

concerning salary ranges on his positions.

Counsel asked you what your intent was with

20

A.

That's correct.

21

Q.

And use of the equal sign wasn't intending

22

to suggest that there was a sort of equivalent between

23

captains in any of these positions?

24

A.

Only in the salary range.

25

Q.

You don't have a copy of the —

well, when
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1

(Recess, 10:20 to 10:30 a.m.)

2

JUDGE VALERGA:

3

MR. NOLAN:

6

Thank you.

KECROSS-EXAMINATION

4
5

Mr. Nolan.

BY MR. NOLAN:
Q.

Ms. Haymond, during the recess at;my

7

request did you get a chance to review the personnel

8

file of William Carlson

9

A.

Yes

10

Q.

—

—

with respect to the issue raised by

11

counsel about this item that is shown on G-12 that

12

talks about a special adjustment in the salary?

13

A.

Yes, I did.

14

Q.

And in your review of the file for the

15

date shown on G-12 on the typewritten page listed for

16

William Carlson, the entry "3/29/94 Special

17

Adjustment," what did you find?

18

A.

It referred to his acting in a temporary

19

capacity at a higher level, and he was awarded an

20

increase for that.

21
22
23

Q.

And what significance does that have in

your judgment?
A.

In my judgment it just shows one more

24

instance that can affect a person's pay range or pay

25

rate over a career.
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1

Q.

Because assuming some additional

2

responsibility or other assignme nt at the request of

3

management presumably?

4

A.

Correct.

5

Q.

Now, referring back to again in G-12,

6

Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark, insofar as this document s hows

7

the path that their careers and salaries have foil owed

8

with the department, and in your review of their

9

personnel files and based upon yrour training and

10

experience with human resources in the Department of

11

Corrections, as of today are Mr. Burr and Mr. Clar k

12

being paid commensurate with the ir experience with the

13

department?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Are they being paid commensurate with

16

their rank as captains?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Are they being paid commensurate with

19

their longevity with the State c)f Utah and the

20

Department of Corrections?

21

A.

MR. DYER:

22
23

interpose?

24

objection.

25

Yes.
Your Hone)r, may I

I assume that this is subject to my

JUDGE VALERGA:

Yes.
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1
2

MR. DYER:
Q.

Thank you.

(BY MR. NOLAN)

Are they being paid

3

commensurate with the duties and responsibilities

4

which each of them carries at the Gunnison prison?

5

A.

6
7

Yes.
MR. NOLAN:

I believe those are all

the questions I have, Judge.

8

JUDGE VALERGA:

9

Mr. Dyer?

10
11
12

Thank you, Mr. Nolan.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DYER:
Q.

I just want to clarify your prior

13

testimony where you talked about the special

14

adjustment.

15

The total remarks are, quote, acting, close quote, in

16

temporary capacity.

17

capacity as what, does it?

Ifve looked at the remark on the HR 33.

It doesn't refer to temporary

18

A.

No, it does not.

19

Q.

And if you look at the HR 33 on its face,

20

there's no indication that there's any change in terms

21

of this individual's position.

22

A.

23

remember.

24

Q.

25

It shows the food service manager too as I

And, in fact, if you look at the action

being taken, it identifies the $1.50 an hour

—
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1

May I approach your Honor?

2

JUDGE VALERGA:

3
4

Q.

—

Yes.

it identifies the adjustment as an

administrative salary adjustment, does it not?

5

A.

Yes, it does.

6

Q.

And when you were testifying earlier about

7

what you had reviewed, this is the document that both

8

you and I and Judge Valerga now are now looking at as

9

the document you were referring to, correct?

10

A.

11
12

Yes.
MR. DYER:

I don't know if your Honor

wants a copy of that document or not.

13

JUDGE VALERGA:

No.

I think the

14

information from it has been explained in the

15

record.

16

Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

Have you ever received

17

any publications while you were HR manager at the

18

Department of Corrections regarding what equity

19

issues are at the DHRM?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

You've never received any kind of guidance

22

in terms of this is what equity issues are for

23

purposes of that rule in terms of publications or

24

bulletins or anything of that nature?

25

A.

No.
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director.
2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

You're aware that Mr. ALJ Smith Robinson

4

had requested a declaratory order from Karen Okabe

5

regarding the interpretation of HRM rules on ASIs and

6

statutory interpretation?

7
8
9

A.

I am absolutely not aware of that.

I

certainly don ! t recall it.
Q.

Okay.

If I were to tell you that as a

10

result of ALJ Robinson making that request of

11

Ms. Okabe he was given instruction by yourself at the

12

request of Mr. Haun to withdraw that declaratory

13

request, do you recall that at all?

14

A.

I answered your previous question, I

15

think, incorrectly, because I thought you said

16

Mrs. Hobby.

There!s a warden there, and I'm thinking

17

Mrs. Hobby.

So we're talking Karen Okabe.

18

Q.

Karen Okabe.

19

A.

In what year now?

20

MR. DYER:

May I approach, your Honor?

21

JUDGE VALERGA:

22

(Witness reviews document.)

23

JUDGE VALERGA:

Yes.

Mr. Dyer, is that

24

document the witness is reading an exhibit in this

25

matter?
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1

MR. DYER:

2

JUDGE VALERGA:

3

It is not.
Do you intend to

introduce it?
MR. DYER:

4

It is one that we would use

5

as a rebuttal exhibit.

6

identify it, and I suspect counsel is going to

7

object because of that.

8

MR. NOLAN:

9

MR. DYER:

10

We did not specifically

Yes.
That's why I'm using it to

reflect his recollection.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

Q.

(BY MR. DYER)

I do recall this.
In fact, Judge Robinson

13

had requested a declaratory order regarding how

14

Section 67-19-12 (3) (b) applies to individuals in pay

15

equity circumstance.

16

made.

That's one of the requests he

17

A.

Yes

18

Q.

And he also requested a declaratory order

19

regarding R477-7-119(c) (iii), how that applies as

20

well, did he not?

21
22

A.

That's what the letter says.

what it says, though.

I don't know

Maybe I do have it before me.

23

Q.

I'm just asking if he requested the

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

And that's in October of '99.

—

That's in the letter, yes.
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1

A.

Yes

2

Q.

And that's prior to —

3

Exhibit A-l —

4

one.

do you have that handy there?

5

MR. DYER:

6

JUDGE VALERGA: Yes.
Q.

7
8

issued.

if you look at
I have

May I approach, your Honor?

A-l is the final order that Mr. Haun
The date on that order is what, Mr. Chabries?

9

A.

I show July 18th, 2000.

10

Q.

And this communication between Judge .

11

Robinson and Ms. Okabe is in October of '99, prior to

12

the issuance of that final order; is that correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And then in December of 1999 Mr. Robinson

15

withdrew that request because he received instruction

16

personally from you, but it was an instruction from

17

Mr. Haun; is that correct?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

As a result, to your knowledge did

20

Ms. Okabe ever give any formal opinions to either

21

Judge Robinson, yourself or Mr. Haun regarding the

22

interpretations of those statutes and rules that he

23

had requested?

24
25

A.

My recall of this matter was this was an

issue that needed to be handled by executive
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1

directors, and a declaratory order, as director Haun

2

stated to me, was not needed, that he would handle it.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

at Exhibit A-l.

5

you.

Now, just taking a moment to look
You don't have a copy of that, do

I!m sorry.

6

A.

Is that the one you just gave me?

7

Q.

The final order.

8

A.

I do have the final order.

9

Q.

Okay.

Exhibit A-l, as I look down at the

10

bottom of the first page, Mr. Haun did some

11

comparisons between Mr. Burr and Mr. Liston.

12

see that next to last paragraph?

Do you

13

A.

Beginning "Mr. Liston"?

14

Q.

Yes.

15

A.

I do see that, yes.

16

Q.

That ! s the comparison that Mr. Haun made;

17

is that correct?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

I don't see in this document any

20

assessment from Mr. Haun that he had made a comparison

21

between Mr. Burr and Mr. Carlson.

22

A.

23

It looks like Mr. Carlson1s situation was

compared with Mr. Clark.

24
25

Do you?

I

Q.

B u t not M r . B u r r .

A.

I don't

see t h a t in this d o c u m e n t .

It's
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Total UDC Mths as
Name
£>©HExp Mths— -Capl
7/25/90
156.2
42
Del Allred
11/28/83
75
235
Russ Armstrong
8/13/84
226.5
83
Cynthia Atkinson
6/22/81
265.2
109
Dan Avis
1/4/93
12
Larry Benzon
114
Alfred Bigelow
1/20/87
198.5
52
7/18/85
215.4
125
David Bradbury
9/18/88
177.4
91
Steve Brough
Ricky Brown
1/17/95
90
6/01/85
289
172
Roger Burnett
•UitHi'liI^
•W4$4Craip"©wH"
1/06/86
210
59
Larry Bussio
-63*p#r
milium Gailjuii
lo/ao/Qt
169
83
Billie Casper
7/01/89
•liiffllni
•W02)'03'
J2&
Utmdl Glanlj
4/07/86
206.8
21
Melvin Coulter
Bryce DeGiulio
7/27/87
191
61
Paul Gardner
8/10/87
179.7
64
1/22/91
131
Bryant Green
149.2
^eil Holladay
7/12/86
192
12
\rthur Hansen
3/31/84
231
125
Shelby Herbert
2/08/88
184.8
26
8/18/86
203.4
30
Bryant Herman
oe Hughes
11/16/81
259.5
67
1/09/89
174.7
31
ohn Irons
4/01/71
150
387
/incent Jack
11/28/83
236
92
Zzx\ Jacobsen
Anthony Johnson
8/10/87
190.7
81
•iichael Kelly
8/31/78
298
26
landy Long
12/24/84
199.7
77
Imothy Parker
7/05/83
239.9
30
1/07/86
209.8
85
lobert Powell
9/01/84
'aul Rasmussen
226
131
odi Scott
5/29/82
253
59
1/19/88
185.3
26
)arin Smith
8/27/86
,yle Smith
113
202
.andy Southwick
8/10/87
190.7
52

^
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J-» /.
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$20.17 55
20.72 56
21.29 57
21.29 57
22.48 59
20.17 55
21.88 58
21.29 57
27.92 64-3
25.74 64
£*-gg- - 5 *
20.17 55
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Ttt*
20.72
20.17
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21.29
21.88
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20.17
20.17
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20.17
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TT
56
55
55
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58
61
55
55
57
55
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57
57
56
57
57
58
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55
55
57
55

„JL
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% Avg
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Exp
Total Exp~
76%
56%
101
114
110
111
128
146
55
16
96
70
104
168
86
122
11
44
140
231

%of
Avg Sal
91%
93
96
96
101
91
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96
126
116
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"oT
82
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91
4*0
93

-ttfr
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•*»
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92
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72
93
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85
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114
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114
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Name
Rex Talbot
Don Taylor
Demont
-Thompson
Steve Turley
Julie Varoz
Averages

DOH
10/4/71
8/10/87
-9/04790—
7/30/90
8/05/91

Total UDC Mths as
Exp Mths
Capt
Pay
Step
237
20.72
66
56
120
296
23.73 61
354
155
120.9
206.7

I—132
36
72
74.6

^7^XB~ ~60
21.29 57
20.17 55
22.21

% Avg
Total Exp
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143
1

73
75
58
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Capt Exp
88
161
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48
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Exhibit D

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

MELODY STAPLES,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND DECISION

Grievant,
v*
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Agency.

CaseNo.19CSRMLO.275

The Step 5 hearing to determine the above-captioned matter was held on October 23 and 24
and November 4,2002, in CSRB Conference Room 1116, State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt
Lake City, Utah before Sherri R. Guyon, Career Service Review Board (CSRB) Hearing Officer.
Melody Staples (Grievant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. The
Utah Department of Health (DOH or Agency) was represented by Laurie L. Noda, Assistant Attorney
General. Jennifer Bingham, Director of Office of Human Resource Management of Department of
Health, was present as the Management Representative. A certified court reporter made a verbatim
record of the proceedings. Witnesses were placed under oath. Testimony and documentary evidence
were received into the record.

The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code,

§63-46b-2(l)(h)(2001)), now makes and enters the following:
AUTHORITY
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold this Step 5 hearing is
found at Utah Code, §67-19a~406(2001) and Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-1 et seq,(200l).
ISSUES
1. Was Grievant dismissed for just cause or for the good of the public service as provided
in Utah Code §67-19-18?
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy?
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Grievant was hired by the state of Utah on S eptcmber 1,1976, and was a child care license
specialist with the DOH's Bureau of Licensing at the time of her dismissal on May 17,2001.

2. Grievant is a career service employee with the state of Utah and qualifies to use these
grievance and appeal procedures. Grievant consistently earned Successful overall ratings on her
performance evaluations as well as Above Standard and Outstanding. (See Grievant Ex. 5.)
3. In 1997, by legislative intent, the DOH was given the duty to enforce the rules and policies
concerning child care licensing. The Agency conducted various training methods to inform
employees of the proper protocols to follow. (See Agency Ex. 4, 7, and 8.) Grievant attended
training meetings and presented a personal training log. (See Grievant Ex. 23.)
a. On September 9,1997, a Southern Region Staff Meeting was held with Melody
Staples in attendance. The minutes showed that there was a discussion on time frames for surveys.
b. On March 9,1999 a Southern Region Staff Meeting was held with Melody Staples
in attendance. Minutes showed that a discussion was held specifically on statements of
findings.
c. On May 17,1999, the minutes of the Southern Region Staff Meeting with Melody
Staples in attendance, showed that a specific discussion was held on the importance of being
specific in writing up deficiencies.
d. On June 9,1999, a Bureau of Licensing Retreat agenda showed that a discussion
was held about rules and protocols.
e. On August 31,1999, a Bureau of Licensing Training Meeting was held wherein
the agenda showed that child care workers had a session on monthly reports/variances, plan
reviews and protocols for Hand Delivery ofNotices, and Sanctions/Conditions/Revocations.
f. On October 27, 1999, A Southern Region Staff Meeting was held with Melody
Staples in attendance, where the minutes showed that specific discussion was held on Class
I and Class II deficiencies.
g. On November 3, 1999, an agenda for a retreat meeting showed that child care
workers had a session about the Technical Assistance Manual.
h. On April 19, 2000, a meeting was held where the Operations Manual was
discussed at a child care training meeting along with other training materials. (See Grievant
Ex. 7.)
i. On September 27, 2000, a Bureau of Licensing Training meeting was held in
which a report from individual licensors was given with emphasis on new developments.
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j . On February 13, 2001, a Southern/Dixie Region Staff Meeting was held, with
Melody Staples in attendance, in which Class Fs were discussed.
4. In December 1999 and 2000, the licensing specialists were instructed to do 100%
self-audits of their case files and report problems to their supervisors as the holidays were a busy
time to conduct inspections. Grievant said she spoke with her supervisor in December 2000 about
follow-up times and was told there was some flexibility.
5. In January 2001, an audit was conducted of all child care license specialists in the Bureau
to provide for overall consistency, The 10% audit revealed that a number of Grievant's case files
were substantially out of compliance with the Agency's policies regarding documentation, follow-up,
and classification. Based on the findings of the audit, Bureau Director Debra Wynkoop ordered a
100% audit of Grievant's case files.
6. On February 20 and 21, 2001, an audit of Grievant's caseload was conducted by her,
supervisor, Dave Eager, and her former supervisor, Joel Hoffman. (See Grievant Ex. 9.) The results
showed that 55 of 64files(86%) contained significant violations of Bureau policies or protocols in
the following five major areas:
1. 25 of 64 files contained Class I deficiencies. Of these 25 files,
22files(90%) did not follow Bureau Class I protocols . ..
2. 14 of 64filescontained multiple follow-up inspections that did not
follow Bureau protocols . . .
3. 14 of 64 (22%) contained late (later than 75 days) follow-up
inspections to annual surveys
4. 4filescontained unapproved Bureau letters to providers....
5. Other problems:
- 12 of 64 (19%) files contained inaccurate provider
histories..,.
- 15 of 64 (23%) files have unacceptable POC's [Plans of
Correction] that were accepted and signed-off.
- Poor complaint write-ups; not have enough information to
support the decision to substantiate or not substantiate... •
7. When Grievant testified about the specific violation problems in the audit of the case files,
she said that she had exercised her discretion to judge the scope and severity of Class I and Class II
violations and that there were various specific factors that entered into the issues of timeliness of
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follow-up inspections, the letters, and the other problems pointed out in the case file audit. The
factors included specific details about the provider, the age and number of children, and particular
details about the facilities among other things. (See Grievant Ex. #10.)
8. On February 20, 2001, Grievant was placed on administrative leave.
9. On February 27,2001, there was a meeting with Grievant to review the audit findings.
At the meeting were Jennifer Bingham, David Eager, and Debra Wynkoop (via telephone). During
the meeting, Grievant said she was having difficulty enforcing the child care licensing rules because
she believed that the providers weren't given enough training. After the meeting, Debra Wyncoop
recommended that Grievant's employment with the DOH be terminated because Grievant knew the
policies of the Agency regarding child care licensing but had failed to enforce them.
10. On March 2,2001, Grievant prepared a written grievance of the Caseload Review which
was sent to Mr. Eagar, Ms. Wynkoop, and Ms. Bingham. (See Grievant Ex. #4.) Among other
things, Grievant stated that in response to the Caseload Review she thinks that the Operations
Manual is incomplete in some of the areas she was cited for, that this was the first audit in 3 1/2
years, and that she would need to see the specific files or know the specific providers to respond to
specific problems.
11. On March 2,2001, a Proposed Dismissal for Cause was sent to Grievant by Iona Thraen,
Division Director, stating that she was being disciplined for serious violations of Bureau survey
protocols. It also stated that Grievant had the opportunity to file a Step 4 appeal to the DOH's
Executive Director, Rod Betit (See Grievant Ex. #L)
12. On March 8,2001, Grievant wrote a written response to the proposed dismissal for cause
to Rod Betit. (See Grievant Ex. #2.) Among other things, Grievant said that the Bureau had been
in a state of transition with policy contradictions by the various supervisors and that she would like
to be given the opportunity to correct some of the problems raised in the audit,
13. On March 23,2001, Char Pehrson and Jennifer Bingham prepared a written Chronology
of Events and Supporting Documentation for Proposed Dismissal of Melody Staples for Rod Betit
(See Grievant Ex #3.) The memo emphasized that in regard to the Class I and Class II deficiencies,
Class I deficiencies included exposed electrical outlets, water temperature hotter than 120 degrees,
cleaning supplies and chemicals not locked, ratios out of compliance, etc. The issue of consistent
discipline was also discussed. It stated that in October 2000, the Bureau had issued a proposed
dismissal for cause for policy violations by an employee. It stated that the policy violations were not
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as serious as the violations in Grievant5 s case files. It further stated that other disciplinary options
were considered.
14. Grievant presented examples of other disciplinary actions taken in the Agency for other
unnamed employees in 2000 and 2001. These other actions included Corrective Action for
Substandard Job Performance and a Two-Day Suspension without Pay for policy violation and a
Two-Day Suspension without Pay for noncompliance with applicable policies and professional
standards. (See Grievant Ex. #17.)
15. On April 20,2001, Char Pehrson, then DOH Director of Human Resources, held a Step 4
hearing with Grievant and her UPEA representative. After the hearing, Ms. Pehrson recommended
termination of the Grievant to Dr. Richard Melton, then DOH Acting Director.
16. Dr. Melton concurred with Ms. Pehrson5s recommendation. On May 17, 2001, the
Department Decision was issued. (See Agency Ex. #1.) The termination was based upon
Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rule R477-11 (l)(a) which allows for
disciplinary action to be taken in cases of noncompliance with DHRM rules, agency or other
applicable policies including but not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards and
workplace policies. Specifically, Grievant was cited for having violated DOH's Rule R430-3
governing inspection and enforcement of licensed child care facilities.
17. On June 12,2001, Grievant timely filed with the CSRB her Request for Agency Action
and/or, Alternatively, Appeal to Career Service Review Board from Final Agency Decision
Terminating Grievant's Employment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A grievancefiledin response to a dismissal is a disciplinary grievance. Since the Agency
bears the burden of proof in disciplinary grievances, DOH bears the burden of proof in this case.
Utah Code, §67-19a-406(2)(a).
2. The evidentiary standard by which DOH must meet its burden of proof is "substantial
evidence." Utah Code, §67-19a-406(2)(c).
3. "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla of evidence," but less than "the
weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is such quantum and type of "relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Zissi v. State Tax
Commission, 842P.2d 848, 853(Utah 1992); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68
(Utah CLApp. 1989).
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4. DOH Policy R430-3 states:
R430-3. General Child Care Facility Rules Inspection and Enforcement.
R430-3-1. Legal Authority.
This rule is adopted pursuant to Title 26, Chapter 39.
R430-3-2. Purpose.
This rule delineates the role and responsibility of the Department in the
enforcement of rules pertaining to health and safety in all child care facilities
regulated by Title 26, Chapter 39, These provisions provide criteria to ensure that
sanctions are applied consistently and appropriately.

5. DOH Policy R430-3-3. Statement of Findings states:
(3) Violations shall be classified as Class I, Class II, and Class III violations.
(a) "Class I Violation" means any violation of a statute or rule relating to the
operation or maintenance of a child care facility which presents imminent danger
to children in the facility, or which presents a clear hazard to the public health.
(b) "Class II Violation" means any violation of a statute or rule relating to the
operation or maintenance of a child care facility which has a direct or immediate
relationship to the health, safety, or security of children in a child care facility.
*****
(5) The Statement of Findings shall include:
(a) The statute or rule violated,
(b) A description of the violation,
(c) the facts which constitute the violation, and
(d) the classification of the violation.
6. DOII R430-3-4.Plan of Correction states:
(2) Within ten working days of receipt of the Plan of Corrections, the Department
shall make a determination as to the acceptability of the plan of correction.
(3) If the Department rejects the Plan of Corrections, the Department shall notify
the facility of the reasons for rejection and may request a revised Plan of Correction
or issue a Notice of Agency Action directing a Plan of Correction and imposing a
deadline for the correction. The facility shall submit a revised plan of correction
within 14 days of receipt of a request

7. DOH Policy R430-3-5, Corrective Action Required for Class I Violations states:
(1) If the Department issues a Class I violation to a licensed or unlicensed child care
facility, the facility shall abate or eliminate the situation, condition, or practice
constituting the Class I violation within a fixed period or time for the correction that
is specified in the Plan of Correction.
(2) The Department shall conduct a follow-up inspection within 14 calendar days
or within the agreed-upon correction period to determine correction of Class I
violations.

8. DOH Policy R430-3-6. Corrective Action Required for Class II Violations states:
(1) A facility served with a Statement of Findings citing a Class II violation shall
correct the violation within the time specified in the Plan of Correction or within a
time approved by the Department, but not to exceed 60 daysfromthe issue date.

Staples v. Health, 19 CSRB/H.0.275

Page 6

(2) The facility shall submit justification to the Department for corrections that take
longer than 60 days, for consideration of approval by the Department
9. The Agency presented substantial evidence of policy violations on numerous Statements
of Findings and Plans of Correction and Class One/Repeat Deficiency Statements by Grievant in the
form of protocols not followed, incorrect classifications (along with correct classifications by
Grievant to demonstrate knowledge of rules), incomplete documentation information, and follow-ups
not completed in correct time frames. The specific rules violated included R430-50-10(l)(a)~first
aid kit, (2)-fire extinguisher, (3)-safe outdoor play space, ^-medicine, poison, dangerous objects,
(8)-electrical outlets, (9)-hot water, and (12) firearms. Grievant's conduct of not following proper
rules and protocols constituted a pattern of conduct of policy violations.
10. DHRM Rule R477-11. Discipline states:
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action.
(1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following
causes or reasons:
(a) noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, including
but not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards and workplace
policies;

11. DHRM Rule R477-11-3(1) states:
When deciding the specific type and severity of discipline, the agency head or
representative may consider the following factors:
(a)
Consistent application of rules and standards
(b)
Prior knowledge of rales and standards
(c)
The severity of the infraction
(d)
The repeated nature of violations
(e)
Prior disciplinary/corrective actions
(f)
Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions
(g)
The employee's past work record
(h)
The effect on agency operations
(i)
The potential of the violations for causing damage to persons or property.

12. The Agency presented substantial evidence of Grievant's noncompliance with Agency
rules and policies. In compliance with R477-11-1, the Agency management decided upon the
discipline of dismissal after considering alternatives.
13. In compliance with R477-11-3(1), the Agency presented substantial evidence that the
discipline was based on just cause and that it was not excessive, disproportionate or an abuse of
agency discretion.
DISCUSSION
Staples v. Health, 19 CSRB/H.0.275
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At Step 5 of the grievance process, the hearing officer has the responsibility to determine
whether the factualfindings,as determined by substantial evidence, support the allegations made by
the agency, and whether the agency has correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes. Utah
Administrative Code, R137-l-21(3)(a), (2001). If the hearing officer determines that the factual
findings support the allegations of the agency, then the hearing officer must determine, giving
deference to the agency's decision, whether the agency's disciplinary action is excessive,
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. Utah Administrative Code,
R17-l-21(3)(b), (2001); Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department ofCorrections, 942 P.2d
933 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
Application of the Factual Findings to the Allegations of the Agency
Grievant argues that there was not substantial evidence of policy violations in this case. She
contends that there is no evidence of children subject to imminent danger and no evidence of actual
harm. She says that she exercised discretion in determining the classification of the types of
problems she observed at the child care facilities in her inspections that were criticized in the audit
of case files. She maintains that she had not received adequate training about Class I and Class II
violations and that she had not been given an adequate opportunity to explain about the specific cases
in her file which were the subject of the problems. In communications with her supervisors and
management, Grievant explained that she had a difficult time enforcing the rules because she felt the
providers had not received adequate training. Grievant also said that the bureau materials such as
the Operations Manual were incomplete and did not provide adequate directions for all the
enforcement activities. She explained that she was not consciously defying the rules and that in the
past when she had been given the opportunity to make corrections to her casefilesshe had done so.
Grievant further argues that she felt this matter was a work performance issue and that she
should have had the opportunity to be placed on a Corrective Action Plan to improve her
performance of enforcing the child care licensing rules. She stated that she had revoked a license
just prior to being placed on administrative leave and that she had been doing enforcing for 3 1/2
years. She noted that she had been working for the State for more than twenty years with a
successful work record.
The Agency argues that this case is a noncompliance issue. Testimony at the hearing showed
that enforcement activities in the position of child care license specialist could consist of both work
performance elements and noncompliance elements, but that the issues in this case were
Staples v. Health, 19 CSRB/H.O. 275
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predominantly noncompliance issues. The enforcement of the rules was the core function of the
position. The rules which were being enforced were the minimum standards set forth by legislative
intent, The policy violations that were pointed out in the audit were very serious viol ations involving
hot water, guns, household chemicals, etc.
The audit showed violations of bureau policies or protocols in five areas- In the first area of
Class I deficiencies, Grievant contends that she used her discretion to classify the violations
according to scope and severity as Class I if there was "imminent danger" and Class II if there was
a "direct and immediate" relationship to health and safety. The Agency explained that the specialists
were trained to classify violations consistently and that Grievant5 s classifications were not consistent
with the other specialists statewide. The specialists could point out problems to their supervisors
who might exercise discretion in particular cases. The specialists were to use some reasonable
judgment, but they were to follow the regulatory requirements used by all the specialists consistently
throughout the bureau.
The second area of violations concerned follow-up inspections. Agency rules and protocols
were not followed in instances where follow-up inspections identified uncorrected deficiencies and
those deficiencies were not reissued on site as repeat deficiencies. To allow for consistency and
quality assurance bureau-wide, the license specialists were to follow consistent methods of reporting
follow-up inspections. Proper documentation of the files is considered a very important aspect of
the enforcement duties.
The third area of violations concerned late follow-up inspections to annual surveys. Agency
rules and policies provide for specific time frames to follow in reporting violations by providers.
A number offilescontained late (later than 75 days) follow-up inspections to annual surveys. The
Agency provided examples of late follow-ups continuing to late 2000. Timeliness is an important
part of bureau protocol inasmuch as the agency is charged with the responsibility to enforce rules
dealing with the health and safety of children. All the license specialists had received training by
the bureau to provide for consistency of application of the procedures yet the violations by Grievant
were more severe than problems seen in other caseworkers' files throughout the bureau.
The fourth area of violations concerned unapproved bureau letters to providers. Grievant
maintained that these letters showed her effort to resolve problems with the providers, but the
Agency maintained that these letters were not written according to approved bureau protocol
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The fifth area of violations concerned other problems with specific items in the files such as
inaccurate provider histories, unacceptable POCs, poor complaint write-ups, and incomplete written
documentation without sufficient information to support a decision to substantiate or not
substantiate. The Agency has the duty to enforce the rules about child care licensing. The licensing
specialists need to be accurate and complete in their documentation of the files so that the Agency
will have the requisite information to properly carry out its duty. Violations of the rules and policies
by employees compromise the Agency's ability to fulfill its function. The Agency provided
substantial evidence of numerous policy violations by Grievant. The allegation by the Agency of
noncompliance with Agency policies and rules by the Grievant is supported by the evidence
produced at the Step 5 hearing.
Application of Rules and Standards to the Facts of the Case
Having concluded that the allegations of the Agency are supported by the evidence and
factual findings, the Hearing Officer must next consider whether the Agency properly applied the
appropriate rules and standards to the case.
The Agency has specific rules and protocol which govern the enforcement duties of the
licensors who regulate the child care facilities in the State. The rules set forth procedures to follow
and time frames to adhere to. The Agency has rules which carefully explain how to prepare
Statements of Findings and Plans of Corrections. The rule requires four elements in the Statement
of Findings as set forth in the rule above. The Agency provided numerous examples where Grievant
had classified Class I violations as Class II violations. Grievant said she exercised discretion
according to the circumstances to reach the classification decision according to scope and severity
of the problem. Her rationale for her decisions is not acceptable or reasonable in light of the
convincing testimony by several agency witnesses that the violations should have been classed as
Class I violations based on the training the Agency had provided and based upon the classifications
by the other license specialists in the bureau. The rules also require specific elements and time
frames to be met in the Plan of Correction. The written forms require evidence of careful
observation of the facility, of careful written documentation stating pertinent facts, and of attentive
adherence to follow-up times. The Agency needs to have careful and complete documentation so
that it can monitor the process effectively. The Agency is required to make a determination of the
acceptability of the plan of correction and if it has incomplete information, it cannot effectively carry
out the process. The Agency provided numerous examples where Grievant had not adequately filled
Staples v. Health, 19 CSRB/H.O. 275
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out all the information required on the forms, including missing signatures, untimely completion
dates, missing dates, and inadequate factual explanations. Grievant explained that there were
specific variables to take into account such as the specific type of facility, the presence or age of
children, the situation of the provider and so forth. However, those factors did not alter the fact that
many forms were seriously incomplete.

The evidence showed a pattern of classification,

documentation, and time-frame problems; the enforcement procedures were not completed according
to Agency rules and procedure.
Grievant argued that the Agency should have followed the provisions it has to place the
Grievant on Corrective Action so that she could have improved her work performance. The Agency
does have policies that allow for employees to be placed on cprrective action, but the Agency
determined that this case is a noncompliance case based on the severity and number of policy
violations committed by the Grievant and applied the disciplinary provisions contained in the rules
that apply to noncompliance. The Agency is charged with the duty to enforce the child care licensing
rules throughout the State, It has established rules for its employees to follow to carry out the duties.
It has provided training for the employees and various manuals and guidelines. The Agency can
reasonably expect that the employees will learn the information presented in training and will also
apply self-study to learn and understand the rules pertaining to their positions. The Agency is using
the resources of the State to conduct training and can reasonably expect that the employees will have
a reasonable and prudent respect for the importance of the rules and will carefully carry them out so
that overall the resources of the State are judiciously used. The Agency appropriately applied
disciplinary rules to this case of Grievant's noncompliance with Agency rules.
Analysis of Agency Discretion with Respect to the Facts of the Case
The final issue to be considered in this case is whether the sanction administered by the
Agency is so excessive or disproportionate, or otherwise so egregious as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. R137-l-21(3)(b), Utah Administrative Code (2001).
Grievant contends that she should have been given the opportunity to improve in her
enforcement duties because in the past when she had been given an opportunity to correct problems
she had done so successfully. The Agency contended that Grievant's efforts to improve in the past
could have been more sincere and that her policy violations were more severe than the problems of
other licensors in the bureau. Grievant presented examples of lesser sanctions given to other
employees in the Agency in 2000 and 2001. The examples did not appear to present the same types
Staples v. Health, 19 CSRB/H.0.275
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or severity of violations as the Grievant's violations were. The Agency presented an example of
consistent discipline in the form of a comparison with an employee who was issued a proposed
dismissal for cause in October 2000 for policy violations based on a case file review.
The exercise of Agency discretion in the imposition of sanctions is provided for in DHRM
rules as stated above. The rules provide guidance for determining the appropriateness of sanctions
including such factors as consistent application of rules and standards, prior knowledge of rules and
standards, the severity of the infraction, the repeated nature of the violations, and the effect on
agency operations. Agency witnesses provided evidence that they had considered various factors
and alternatives in reaching their decision about what discipline to impose on Grievant.
The evidence showed severe and numerous policy violations by Grievant infiveimportant
areas of enforcement duties. The Agency had been involved in enforcement duties for 3 1/2 years
under new mandates, but the audit revealed serious violations by Grievant to a degree not seen in
other license specialists throughout the State. Grievant explained that she was exercising discretion,
but more sound decision-making could be expected by a long-term employee of the State. The
Agency exercised its discretion to determine the sanction of dismissal for just cause based on
Grievant's noncompliance with Agency rules and policies. Substantial evidence was not presented
to show that the Agency inconsistently applied its rules and policies to Grievant. Based on the
totality of the circumstances, the Agency's decision to dismiss Grievant is reasonable and is not
arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion.
DECISION
For the foregoing reasons, the grievance filed herein is respectfully denied and the
disciplinary action of dismissal is upheld.
DATED this 25th day of November 2002.

rvJ'
Sherri R. Guyon
Hearing/Presiding Officer
Career Service Review Board

RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b).
APPEAL
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must befiledwith the Career Service Review Board within
ten working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code S67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).
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Grievants and Appellants,
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FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
THE STEP 6 DECISION
AND FINAL AGENCY ACTION
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On Monday, January 12, 2004, the Career Service Review Board (Board) received
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration of the Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action Dated
December 22, 2003. After carefully reviewing and considering Appellants' motion, the legal
arguments raised therein, and its Decision and Final Agency Action (Decision), the Board hereby
denies their request for reconsideration and upholds its December 22,2003 Decision.

DATED this 27th day of January 2004.
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Blake S. Atkin, Chair
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Felix J. McGowan, Member
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Career Service Review Board

JUDICIAL REVIEW
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1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 • Voice 538-3048 • Fax 538-3139

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 28th day of January 2004, (1) I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the foregoing
Denial ofAppellants* Motion for Reconsideration of the Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action Dated
December 22, 2003 in the matter of Craig Burr and Lowell Clark v. Utah Department of Corrections to
the following:
Craig Burr
595 West 350 North
Salina UT 846544035

Lowell EL Clark
255 North 600 West
Maiiti UT 846424234

(2) I sent an E-mail with a copy of the original document attached to the following:
Michael P. Chabries
Executive Director
Utah Department of Corrections

Audry Wood
Executive Director
UPEA
nudrvwooci 'a upoa.net

David Salazar
HR Director
Department of Corrections
cJsal^zarr/'utcili.iiov

Lori Worthington
Division of Institutional Operations
Utah Department of Corrections
l\vorrhintfurah.«ia\

Linda Whitney
HR Manager
Utah Department of Corrections
[JndaV\hitnc^-(-/'ntah.eo\and 3) I faxed a copy to:
Phillip W. Dyer
Carey A. Seager
Attorneys at Law
136 South Main Street, Suite 221
Salt Lake City UT 84101-3659
801.363.5051
Patrick L. Nolan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
801.538.1779

^ < ^ ££ 2
Claudia L. Jones
Legal Secretary

^

-ci.

Exhibit F

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

CRAIG BURR and LOWELL EL CLARK,
DECISION
AND
FINAL AGENCY ACTION

Grievants and Appellants,

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
CaseNos. 7 CSRB 69 (Step 6)
18 CSRB/H.O.259 (Step 5)

Agency and Respondent.

On Thursday, October 23, 2003, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB)
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair, Felix J. McGowan,
Joan M. Gallegos, and Dale L. Whittle.

Messrs. Craig Burr and Lowell H. Clark

(Grievants/Appellants) were present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, who
presented oral argument on Appellants' behalf. Carey A. Seager, Attorney at Law, was also present
and assisted Mr. Dyer at Counsel's table. Assistant Attorney Patrick B. Nolan, represented the
Department of Corrections (Department and DOC) with Linda Whitney, Human Resource Manager,
present as the Department's management representative.
AUTHORITY
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code Annotated at §§ 67-19a-101
through -408 (Supp. 1998) (hereinafter Utah Code) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal
Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State Personnel Management Act (USPMA) at
§§ 67-19 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the Utah Administrative Code at
R137-1-1 through -23 {Supp, 1998). This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the final
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Messrs. Burr
and Clark's appeal of the denial of their salary grievance. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and
these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-11 &(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining
to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. (§§ 63-46b et seq.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about May 28,1998, Appellants "submitted a 'pay inequity' grievance alleging that
the Department of Corrections (the agency) had inequitably applied the Captain's salary range'
between Appellants and others employed by the Department in the same position. (Appellants' Brief
on Appeal at 2). The remedy or relief sought by Appellants was to have their salary increased by
four steps. (Utah Department of Corrections Staff Grievance, May 28, 1998).{
On May 28, 1998, the Career Service Review Board's Administrator consolidated the
Appellants' grievances pursuant to CSRB rule R137-1-17. The Department's final order or Step 4
decision was issued on July 18,2000. (Agency Ex. 1),
In making his Final Decision, former Executive Director H.L. "Pete" Haun reviewed the
salary histories of Appellants and others holding the same position as Appellants. After conducting
his review, Executive Director Haun determined that Appellants had received all "the increases to
which they were entitled." (Id.) Moreover, Executive Director Haun determined that administrative
salary increases were discretionary and that the favorable exercise of discretion at one point of an
employee's career does not entitle others to receive administrative salary increases when the
employees' career paths merge. (Id)
After considering all these factors, Executive Director Haun concluded that "discretion to
grant administrative salary increases is found in the currentrule, R477-7-3(l 1 ) . . . The increase must
be justified . . . In these circumstances I do not see how the increases Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark seek
can be justified. Therefore, I deny their grievances " (Id)
Thereafter, on or about August 11, 2000, Appellants timely filed their appeal of Executive
Director Pete Harm's Final Decision with the CSRB*
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING

On Wednesday, August 14, and Thursday, August 15,2003, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was
held before CSRB Hearing J. Francis Valerga (Hearing Officer). At the nearing, Appellants were
represented by Phillip W- Dyer, Attorney at Law.
Patrick B. Nolan, Assistant Attorney General.

The Department was represented by

Assisting Mr. Nolan, was the Department's

management representative, David Salazar, the Human Resource Director for the Department.

^hese grievances are part of the file maintained by the CSRB.
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The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code,
§ 67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellants are challenging the Department's denial of their
grievance relating to salary or wages, Grievants have the burden of proving their case by substantial
evidence and the burden of going forward. (Utah Code, § 67-19a-406(2)(b) and- (p)) The specific
issues adjudicated at the Appellants5 Step 5 hearing were twofold. First, were Grievants entitled to
prevail on their salary or wage grievance? If so, what was the appropriate remedy? (Prehearing
Conference Summary and Order, at 2, *f 6; Notice of Rescheduled Administrative Hearing, May 2,
2002; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order, at 1)
On or about May 1,2001, prior to the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Department filed
two separate motions in this case. The first was a Motion to Dismiss along with an accompanying
Memorandum in Support asking that the Appellants' grievance be dismissed for failure to allege a
specific 'Violation of a law or rule." The second was a Motion for Order in Limine requesting an
order to exclude "any evidence or testimony relating to salary comparison of persons not classified
as 'captain' within the Utah Department of Corrections," On July 2, 2001, the Hearing Officer
entered a joint order denying both the Department's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Order in
Limine.
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter^ the hearing officer received evidence relating to
Appellants5 salary grievance. Specifically, there was testimony given and documentary evidence
received concerning the Appellants' salary, both at the time of the filing of their grievance2 and at
the time of the hearing, in relation to other departmental employees employed in the same job
classification as Appellants and performing the same or similar work.3
In addition, testimony was heard and evidence received concerning the granting of

2

Both Mr. Burr and Mr. Clark filed their original grievance in May 1998. These grievances are
essentially identical, both in the statement of the problem and the relief requested. Based upon these facts,
the then CSRB Administrator consolidated the grievances in accordance with CSRB rule R137-1-17. This
consolidation was done pursuant to separate letters to Messrs. Burr and Clark dated May 28, 1998.
3

Appellants' case focuses primarily on two specific employees employed by the Department in the
same job classification as Appellants, doing the same or similar work as Appellants, but being paid more.
However, evidence was clearly received regarding other employees employed by the Department in the same
job classification as Appellants' and performing the same or similar work. The two employees with whom
Appellants compared themselves are William Carlson and Randall Keven Harr. At the time of the Step 5
evidentiary hearing, the undisputed facts establish that Appellants Burr and Claik were making $21.88 and
$21.29 respectively. (Exhibit G2. G12; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order at 5 n3)
At the time of the hearing, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr were making $24.38 and over $25.00 respectively. (Id.)
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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administrative salary increases (ASI) under Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM)
rule R477-7-4-(l l). 4 Specifically, evidence was received and considered as to whether the
Department's Executive Director' s decision to deny Appellants an ASI was an arbitrary or otherwise
an abuse of discretion.5
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Step 5 Decision) dated December 13, 2002. In reaching this
Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer clearly examined the evidence presented at the evidentiary
hearing and carefully considered the legal arguments presented by the parties both at the hearing and
in their post-trial briefs.6 After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing and examining the
relevant statutes, the Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 Decision denying Appellants5 grievance and
upholding the Department's Final Order dated July 18,2000. (Step 5 Decision at 12) In reaching his
Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer essentially concluded that the Department had not violated
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), (b) or 6749-3.L The Hearing Officer also concluded that the
denial of the ASFs sought by Appellants was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion and
constituted a discretionary internal personnel matter exemptfromreview by the CSRB. {Id. at 5,11)
B, ISSUES ON APPEAL

In the Appellants' appeal before this Board, they challenge numerous aspects of the Hearing
Officer's Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Appellants argue that the Hearing Officer erred in legally
concluding that Appellants had received all the salary increases to which they were entitled by law
and that the specific statutory provisions relied upon by Appellants in support of their salary
grievance applied to salary ranges, not to individual salaries. (Appellants5 Brief on Appeal at 4-5,
16-18)

4

The Board notes that the DHRM rule existing at the time Appellantsfiledtheir grievance has been
modified and that the existing rule received into evidence as Exhibit A2 omits "equity issues" as a reason
supporting the granting of an ASI. The Hearing Officer did however, with the approval of the parties, hand
write into Exhibit A2 the words "equity issues" which accurately reflects the wording of the rule at the time
Appellants filed their grievance (TrU at 156-159).
5

At the time Appellants filed their grievance, HJL. "Pete" Haun was the executive director of the
Department- Mr. Haun issued his Final Order on July 18, 2000, denying Appellants' grievance at the
departmental level. This Final Order was timely appealed to the CSRB on August 11, 2000.
5

Review of the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision establishes numerous references to the case law
cited by both parties in their post-trial briefs and specifically quotes from pages 14-15 of the Appellants'
post-trial brief.
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Tn addition, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Department's
Executive Director's decision to deny Appellants3 grievance and not grant the four-step ASI
Appellants requested was arbitrary or otherwise an abuse of discretion. Appellants also challenge
the Hearing Officer's finding that the Department's decision to not grant an ASI to Appellants was
an internal, discretionary personnel action and therefore exempt from review by the CSRB and the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-1(2).
Appellants also assert that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the responsibility for
enforcing and carrying out the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3 )(a), (b) and 67-19-3.1
is the responsibility of DHRM. Appellants assert that their rights are independent of whether DHRM
or the Department is responsible for implementing these statutes and that any failure on the part of
DHRM does not excuse the Department from complying with these provisions. (Appellants' Brief
on Appeal at 4, 21)
Finally, in their Brief on Appeal, Appellants challenge two factual findings of the Hearing
Officer. These challenges focus primarily on the Hearing Officer's findings concerning the work
duties and responsibilities of the Correctional Institution Program Coordinator, Correctional Support
Services Supervisor III and the Correctional Captain7 and Appellants' assertion that no specific
reasons were identified for the differences in pay between Appellants and Messrs. Carlson and Harr
specifically.
In essence, Appellants challenge the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision that the disparity in
salary between Appellants and other Department employees performing the same or similar duties
as Appellants and in their same job classification does not violate the provisions of the USPMA,
specifically §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), 67-19-12(3)(b) or 67-19-3.1 (l)(b). Appellants also assert that the
Hearing Officer erred in determining that the Department's Executive Director's decision to deny
Appellants' grievance and the four-step ASI which they requested was not arbitrary, capricious or
otherwise an abuse of discretion. Finally, Appellants assert that two of the factual findings of the
Hearing Officer were not supported by substantial evidence and therefore are, ostensibly, insufficient
to uphold his conclusions of law. Each of these issues will be addressed in the remainder of this

7

For purposes of this Decision and Final Agency Action, theBoard will follow the designations given
to these positions by the parties at the evidentiary hearing. The Correct! onal Institution Program Coordinator
will hereinafter be referred to as the "IPC." The Correctional Support Services Supervisor HI will be referred
' to the "SSHI," and the Correctional Caption will be referred to simply as "Captain."
Burr & Clark v Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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Decision and Final Agency Action.
G THE BOARD'S APPELLANT STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a)(c), (Supp. 2003), which reads as follows:
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the
factualfindingsof the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional
factual findings.
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the
factualfindingsbased upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined
according to the above provisions.
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies,
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the decision of the
Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts
together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were
considered by the Hearing Officer.
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BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
L PRIOR BOARD CASES ADDRESSING SALARY EQUITY GRIEVANCES

At the outset, the Board cites with approval to the long line of Board cases holding that
"equity alone

is not a controlling principle upon which employment relations' remedies are

conditioned " {Division ofEnvironmental Health v Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15,7 (1984))s The
Board continues to believe the principles supporting this ruling are sound and perhaps best stated
m Lundv Division of Health Care Financing, 3 PRB 24 (1987) wherein our predecessor board
stated "When and if cases are determined on the basis of' equity' alone, they may not be dispositive
to legally sound or logically reasoned decision-making " (Id at 8)
In Lund, the PRB went on to conclude (hat
[Tjhere will likely always exist salary inequities for some employees given
the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring practices, its
change in philosophies by different administrations and department
executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel rules m order to
adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other germane reasons
that need not be included herein

(Id)
Following the Lund decision, the Board again decided a pay equity salary grievance in
C C Patel v Division of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991) In this case, the Board held
that
Preuously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same job
title are paid at the same rate The State's current pay plans do not
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees because
variable factors foster pay rate differences Variations in employees'
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money incieases,
legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments
(COLAs) which alter the State pay plans entry rates (creating salary
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted
service and rehiring [sic], reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other
job-related factors
(Id at9) 9

This decision was decided by the Personnel Review Board (PRB) The PRB was the predecessor
of the Career Service Reviev> Board
9

By way of footnotes m both their Brief on Appeal and in their Post-Hearmg Reply Brief, Appellants
argue that the Patel decision "supports' their position (Appellants Brief on Appeal at 18 Post-Hearmg
Burr &Claikv Corrections 7 CSRB 69
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The Board finds it significant that at the time the Board decided Patel, the State's pay plan
also required that the Department design a plan to achieve "equal pay for equal work." {Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19-2(4)(b) (1985)) Under that statutory framework, the Patel Board concluded that such
provisions did not contemplate that all employees with the same job title would be paid the same.
(Id.) Though there have been changes to the USPMA since Patel, the Board believes there still exist
substantial and significant similarities between the current legislatively designed compensation
system and the one existing at the time Patel was decided.
Based upon these factors, the Board affirms and upholds the prior decisions cited above. The
Board continues to believe that the State's current pay plan does not contemplate identical pay rates
for employees performing similar or even the same duties.
It is the finding of this Board that the State's compensation system, currently codified
primarily at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12, has been purposely designed by the Legislature so that
salary ranges for each class of position are to be expansive enough to allow for the normal growth
and productivity potential of each individual employee, including those assigned to the same
position. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(4)(c)(ii)). In addition, and as stated by the Board in Pate/, the

Reply Brief at 3) In support of their argument, Appellants cite to a portion of the Patel decision wherein the
Board quoted from the hearing officer's Step 5 decision. The pertinent language cited by Appellants
provides as follows:
The pay range should reflect equal pay for equal work. (See UCA
67-19-12(4).) The concept of equal pay for equal work is confined to
employees with the same classification. Equal pay is not, as Mr. Patel
argues, a generic concept comparing duties in different classifications.
Mr. Patel is insured [of] equal pay for equal work within his
classification." (Highlighted emphasis in original.)
In the instant case, the Board does not believe the language set forth above "supports" Appellants'
position. The Board bel ieves this language applies to salary ranges and that salary ranges must reflect equal
pay for equal work. Moreover, even assuming the hearing officer' s language cit^d by Appellants applies to
individual salaries, as opposed to salary ranges assigned to employee positions, the Board believes that
Appellants' reliance on the Board's decision in Patel is misplaced.
Close review of the Patel decision establishes that the Board never affirmatively adopted the hearing
officer's language cited to and relied upon by Appellants, In fact, the Board purposely determined "to make
a more reserved conclusion" than that reached by the Hearing Officer." {Id. at 9) Specifically, the Board
held that it was not necessary for the hearing officer to make this ^conclusion" to deny Patel3s grievance.
Instead, the Board reached its decision in Patel based primarily on State statutes which the Board simply
concluded did not contemplate identical salaries between employees performing the same or similar duties.
{Id.)
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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State's compensation system was also designed to achieve ''comparability of State salaries to wages
and salaries paid by private enterprise and other public employment for similar work." (Id. at 10)
(Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-12(4)(b))
Based upon the overall design and complexity of the State compensation system, the Board
finds it is reasonable to believe - or even expect - that employees will grow and progress through
their designated salary range at differing salary rates based upon the inevitable exigencies present
in any workforce,10 It is also reasonable to expect that, on occasion, stresses and strains will result
regarding salary comparisons or disparities between employees, even those in the same job
classification. However, absent violation of statute or rule, such disparities are simply insufficient
to allow an employee to prevail on a wage or salary grievance.
II. REVIEW OF T H E UTAH STATE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT A C T
REGARDING EQUITABLE AND COMPETITIVE COMPENSATION 1 ]

In apparent recognition that "equity alone" is insufficient to support their grievance,
Appellants assert that the statutory language cabined within Utah Code Ann. § § 67-19-12(3)(a) and
(b), and 67-19-3.1(1 )(b) requires that they be paid a salary "equal" to that paid to other individuals
employed by the Department in their same job classification and performing the same or similar
duties as Appellants. The specific statutory provision relied upon by Appellants in support of their
argument provides as follows:
(3)(a) The director shall prepare, maintain, and revise a position
classification plan for each employee position not exempt under subsection
(2) to provide equal pay for equal work
(b) Classification of positions shall be based on similarity of duties
performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job requirements
and the same salary range maybe applied equitably to each position in the
same class, (Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) (Emphasis
added))
67-19-3.1(1) The Department shall establish a career service system
designed in a manner that will provide for the effective implementation of

Indeed, though unnecessary to the Board's decision in this matter, we can think of virtually no
situation in State government where employees, even those filling the same position, are truly performing
''equal work." Equal work is certainly not a factor in this case, (Tr J, 29, 47, 61-62, 126-127; TrU at 178ISO) (PateUtlQ)
1

Providing for equitable and competitive compensation is one of the principles governing the
interpretation of the USPMA This is codified at Utah Code Ami. § 67-19-3.1.
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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the following merit principles:
***
(b) providing for equitable and competitive compensation
(Utah Code Ann. §67-19-3 J(l)(b) (2000) (emphasis added))
Appellants assert that these provisions of the USPMA "unequivocally5* create a right for
Appellants to receive "equal pay for equal work," equitable application of their salary range based
on an "equal pay for equal work" premise and equitable and competitive compensation. (Appellants7
on Appeal at 17)
In addressing this specific argument, the Hearing Officer held that; "Utah Code Ann.
§§ 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) do not mean that employees who have similar education and experience
and who are classified the same because they do the same work, must receive the same salaries.
They mean such employees must have the same salary ranges." (Step 5 Decision at 5)
Elaborating on these two statutory provisions, the Hearing Officer held that:
1 do notread Sections 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) the same way as Grievants do.
Grievants read those two subsections as meaning employees who have
similar education and experience and who are classified the same because
they do the same work, must have the same salaries. I read them to mean
employees who are classified the same because they do the same work must
have the same salary ranges. In that regard, while Grievants and the two
employees with whom they compare themselves do not have the same
salaries, they do have the same salary ranges. (Id. at 10)
Further addressing Appellants' statutory claims of entitlement to "equal pay for equal work5'
(Appellants5 Brief on Appeal at 17), the Hearing Officer concluded that:
The agency has not violated Utah Code, §§ 67-19-12(3)(a), 67-19-12(3)(b),
or 67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act by its actions in
this case because the responsibility for enforcing and carrying out those
statutes belongs to the Department of Human Resource Management and
the agency cannot undertake functions which are reserved by law to another
agency, (Step 5 Decision at 5)
The Board agrees with the Hearing Officer's decision relating to Appellants' statutory claims
of entitlement to "equal pay for equal work/' First, the Board agrees that the responsibility for
designing and implementing the statutes relied upon by Appellants rests with DHRM and not with
the Department.32 Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-3(7) specifically defines Department as "Department of

The Board recognizes that this portion of our decision, relating to the responsibility for designing
and implementing the provisions of the State's position classification and pay plans, is largely unessential
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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Human Resource Management/'

Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-3,l(l)(b) specifically charges the

Department, DHRM> with the responsibility of designing and implementing a career service system
that allows for "equitable and competitive compensation." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3.1(1 )(b))
Likewise, it is the director of DHRM that is charged with the assignment set forth in Utah Code A nn.
§ 67-19-12(3) of preparing and maintaining a position classification plan to provide "equal pay for
equal work" and to ensure that the classification of positions reflect that "the same job requirements
and the same salary range be applied equitably to each position in the same class." (Id)
The Board believes that a plain reading of the State's entire compensation system codified
primarily at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12 requires that the director of DHRM design and administer
its provisions.

Indeed, Utah Code Ann § 67-19-8(1) and (2) provide that the design and

administration of the State's classification system and pay plan are functions DHRM must perform
and cannot delegate.13 The Department's role is limited by statute to assisting DHRM by
recommending position classifications and grade allocations, (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-9(2)).
Second, and as touched upon in Section I above, the Board does not believe the Department's
actions in this case violate the statutes relied upon by Appellants to support their claim of entitlement
to "equal pay for equal work." As stated previously, the Board does not believe that the State's
current compensation system requires that employees who are in the same job or position
classification and performing the same or similar duties must receive the same individual salaries.
It is sufficient if each employee position within the State's position classification plan is assigned
to a salary range allowing for equal pay for equal work between comparable employee positions.
The emphasis of Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-12(3) is on employee positions not individual
salaries. Indeed, Utah Code Ann, § 67-19-12(4)(c) specifically contemplates that each employee
position will be assigned "to a salary range broad enough to reflect the normal growth and
productivity potential of employees" assigned to a particular position.
Reading these statutes as a whole, the Board does not believe that the Legislature
contemplated that the "normal growth and productivity potential" of employees assigned to a
in light of our ultimate conclusions that the statutes relied upon by Appellants in this case, specifically Utah
Code Ann. §§ 67-19-3.1, 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b), were not violated. However, the Board has chosen to
address this issue for clarity purposes.
b

The specific language set forth in Utah Code Ann § 67-19-8 states that: "The department shall
perform the following functions. . . .(1) design and administration of the state pay plan; (2) design and
administration of the state classification system and procedures for determining schedule assignments."
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 1 CSRB 69
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position would be in lockstep. Rather, salary ranges are designed to enable employees, once
assigned to a position, to advance through the salary range based upon their own individual growth
or productivity. Based upon these factors, it is reasonable to expect variations in individual salaries
between employees within the same salary range.
In the instant case, the facts establish that Appellant Burr became a Captain in April 1992.
(Gvt Ex. 12, Agency Ex. 3; Tr.I at 104, 113; Tr.II at 186). Appellant Clark became a Captain in
Junel993. (Gvt. Ex. 12, Agency Ex. 3; Tr.I at 128; Tr.II at 186), Since those dates, the Department
has transferred Appellants on several occasions between the positions of Captain, IPC and SSHL14
(Gvt. Ex.12). These transfers involved no loss of salary or salary range to Appellants. (Gvt. Ex. 12).
From the record, it appears that once an employee attains the position of Captam, IPC, or SSIII the
Department has with some regularity transferred its employees among these three positions,
(Tr.Iat29, 56).
Significantly, the Board notes that at all times relevant to this matter, the salary range
attached to the positions of Captain, IPC, and SSIII were/are identical (Tr.I at 26,28, 57, 64, 174).
The salary range attached to these positions is 47-64. (Id.)}5 In addition, it is clear from the record
that the Department, for staffing and perhaps other purposes, has treateu the positions of Captain,
IPC and SSL! as functionally interchangeable.16 {Id.; Tr.I at 43; Gvt. Ex. 3).
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr are the specific individuals v/ith whom Appellants compare
themselves to establish their claims. Mr. Carlson became an SSIII in September 1993. (Gvt. Ex. 12;
Tr.I at 383-384). Since that time, Mr. Carlson has also held the position of Captain and IPC. (Id.).

See Footnote 6 on page 5
15

Significantly, Appellants do not challenge that they are being paid within their appropriate salary
lange. Based upon the record as a whole, the Board finds that Appellants are being paid within their salary
range. The Board also finds that Appellants have received all merited salary increases commensurate with
their positions as captains and in relation to the duties and responsibilities they perform and the promotions
they have received. (Tr.II at 181-182, 191, 208-209; Agency Ex. 1)
16

In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer found that "while the positions of IPC, SSIII and
Captain have been treated over the years somewhat interchangeable, they are not Captain positions because
their functions are different." (Step 5 Decision, 33 Finding of Fact 25).
To the extent ourfindingshere correct those of the Hearing Officer on this limited fact, they are
corrected. (See CSRB rule R137-l-22(4)(a).) However, for the reasons set forth in this decision, this
correction is of little or no relevance and does not alter our determination to sustain the Hearing Officer's
decision.
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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Likewise, Mr. Harr became an SSIH hi September 1993. (Gvt Exs, 6,13; Tri at 66)J7
The facts of this case establish that since at least 1993, Messrs, Burr, Clark, Carlson and Harr
haye each occupied various positions within the Department having differing functions or
assignments, but based upon the overall duties and responsibilities of those positions, the
Department has treated these positions as functionally interchangeable. The facts also establish,
however, that both prior to and after these individuals obtained their position of Captain, IPC or
SSIII, their career paths have been diverse and separate from each othei.
For example, each of these individuals was hired at different starting salaries.] 8 (Gvt. Ex. 12)
Even at the time these individuals became what Appellants call "Captains," their salaries were
variant ranging between $12.27 per hour and $14.46 per hour (Id.) The differences in these
individuals' current salaries has also been impacted by numerous factors including Cost of Living
Adjustments (COLAs), merit increases, probationary increases, Market Comparability Analyses
(MCAs) and promotions. (Gvt. Exs. 6,12)19 With respect to Mr. Carlson, the facts clearly establish
that in March 1994, he received a substantial upward salary adjustment for temporarily assuming
responsibilities of a higher level position. (Gvt. Ex. 12; Tr.II at 207-208). Based upon the
evidentiary record, the Board finds this salary adjustment appropriate and does not believe that

1

Though Mr. Harr has held other positions since becoming an SSIII, he has not had the position of
IPC or Captain. (Id.)
18

Mr. Harr had the highest starting salary rate of $11.36 per hour. Mr. Harr was hired in 1990.
Conversely, Mr. Clark's starting salary was $6.22 per hour. Mr. Clark was hired in 1983. Significantly, the
Board notes that in 1990, when Mr. Harr was hired, his starting salary of $ 11.36 per hour was nearly a dollar
more per hour than what Mr. Clark was making in 1990. By 1990, Mr. Clark had been employed with the
Department for approximately seven years. Mr. Burr, who like Mr. Harr was hired in 1990, had a beginning
salary nearly $1.50 per hour less than Mr. Harr. (Gvt. Ex. 12).
19

With respect to merit and COLA increases, it is to be expected that those will never be uniformly
applied to all employees holding the same position. If merit increases mean anything at all, they mean that
employees receive increases based upon their individual productivity and growth in comparison with other
similarly situated employees. (See Utah Code Ann. § 67-1942(4)(c)(iiI)). In addition, the disparity in
relation to COLAs is best illustrated by the following example. If Employee A is making $10.00 per hour
and Employee B is making $20.00 per hour, a one percent COLA increase across the board will result in a
$. 10 per hour raise for Employee A and a 5.20 per hour raise for Employee B. The record establishes that
since being hired, these individuals have all received merit and COLA increases. Based upon our discussion
above, it is not reasonable to expect that these increases would be uniform. These are additional
circumstances leadingthis Board to conclude that Appellants' reliance on Utah Code Ann, §§ 67-19-3.Land
67-10-12(3)(a) and (b) is misplaced.
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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granting such an adjustment was an abuse of discretion on the part of the Department.20
As stated best by the Board mPateL variations in employees' individual salaries "result from
such factors and conditions as promotions, career mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit
money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost of living adjustments (COLAs)
which alter the State pay plans1 entry rates (creating salary compression), length of service, long-term
leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings, reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other
job-related factors." (Patel at 9).
The Board finds many of these factors present in the instant case.

(Gvt Ex.12;

Agency Ex. 3) Moreover, Appellants are clearly being paid within their salary range and have
received the salary increases to which they are entitled. (TrJI at 181-182, 191, 209-210; Agency
Ex, 1)
Applying the facts of this case to the statutory provisions governing the State's compensation
system, including those relied on by Appellants, the Board finds the Hearing Officer's Step 5
Decision to be correct. Furthermore, the Board simply does not believe that the law, as cited by
Appellants, requires that employees whose positions are classified the same and who do the same
or similar work, e.g., Captains, IPCs and SSIIIs, must receive the same individual salaries.
Therefore, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision on this matter,
III. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES REGARDING SALARY INCREASES

On appeal to this Board, Appellants do not challenge the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of
Law that "[t]he granting or denying of an ASI21 in accordance with Utah Administrative Code,
R477-7-4(ll) is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head." (Step 5 Decision,
Conclusion of Law 5, at 4). The Board agrees.
In Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 568, 754, the Utah Court of Appeals
addressed the jurisdictional parameters of the CSRB. In Lopez, the Court held that:
Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain
benefit, the employee may not demand it as a right. . » Lopez has failed to

Again, to the extent our findings here correct the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact 29, it is so
corrected. (CSRB rule R137-l-22(4)(a)).
21

ASI is the common acronym for the DHRM rule allowing for administrative salary increases. As
stated in footnote 4 above, at the time Appellants filed their grievance, this rule could be found at Utah
Administrative Code R4?7-7-4(l 1). It is currently found at Utah Administrative Code R477-6-4(10).
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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identify any personnel rule that was violated by the Commission's refusal
to allow him to job share. Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied.
(IdAt 9) (emphasis added).
Based upon the Lopez decision, it is clear that the CSRB has no jurisdiction to review
discretionary personnel decisions.22 Recognizing the need for such a statutory or administrative
mandate, Appellants argue that such a mandate is cabined within the three previously cited statutes
codified in the USPMA. (Appellants' Brief on Appeal at 19 and 20). As previously discussed at
length above, the Board simply does not read the statutes as mandating equal pay for employees
employed in the same job classification and performing the same or similar duties. Absent the
finding of such a mandate, this Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision.23
Next, Appellants argue that the Department's Executive Director's decision to deny their ASI
was arbitrary, capricious and constituted an abuse of discretion in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 63-46b-16(4)(h). Appellants base this claim on the fact that in 1998, when Appellants' initial
grievance was denied, the Department's Executive Director granted another employee within the
Department a seven-step ASL24
The statute relied upon by Appellants provides in pertinent part as follows:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
***
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

~ The appellate record is essentially void of any challenge to the discretionary nature of the AST rule.
The only conceivable challenge the Board could identify is located at page 19 of the Appellants' Brief on
Appeal wherein Appellants infer that the ASI rule is not discretionary. On page 19, the Appellants provide
"[e]ven if this rule (AS!) is interpreted to grant disci etion . . . ."
^The Board notes that this case relates to "wage" or "salary". Appellants have alleged throughout
the grievance process that the way to remedy their alleged "pay inequity" or wage disparity in comparison
with other Department employees would be through an "ASI". The Board notes however, that absent the
underlying wage or salary issues present in this case, the CSRB would not even have "jurisdiction" to
address ASIs. Lopez was a jurisdictional review. The Court clearly held that the CSRB does not have
"jurisdiction" over discretionary personnel matters.
24

The evidentiary record identifies this other individual as James Braithwaite. (Tr.I at 86-89, Tr.II

at 227).
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In addressing Appellants' argument, the Board notes its agreement with the Hearing Officer that one
instance, wherein the Department granted an ASI to another employee, does not equate to a "prior
practice" as required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). In addressing this issue, the Hearing
Officer correctly stated that "characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a 'prior practice5 maybe
stretching the meaning of the word 'practice5,"

(Step 5 Decision at 12 n.6). The Board simply

does not find that the evidence presented at the hearing is sufficient to establish a "prior practice'5
by the Department.
Moreover, the evidence does not establish that the Executive Director's decision to deny
Appellants' ASI was arbitrary or capricious. Executive Director Haun clearly examined the facts
Appellants used in support of their request for an ASI and determined, within his lawful discretion,
that Appellants had received all "the increases to which they were entitled." In making this
determination, Executive Director Haun also noted that Appellants had, at various times during their
employment, received ASIs, promotions and other increases. (Agency Ex. 1)
However, even assuming, which the Board does not, that the granting of a single ASI by the
Department creates a "prior practice55 binding the Department, the Board finds that Appellants
reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 67-46b-l et seq25 is misplaced. The statutory scope and applicability
of UAPA specifically exempt from its provisions internal personnel actions within an agency
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions. The specific language provides
as follows:
(2) This chapter does not govern:
(e) [Ijnternal personnel actions within an agency concerning its own
employees, or judicial review of those actions;
Executive Director Haun's departmental level or Step 4 decision was clearly an internal
personnel action and therefore exempt from the provisions of UAPA. The Legislature has
specifically designed and created the USPMA and the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101 et seq to address internal personnel actions within an
agency concerning its own employees and review of those actions.
Based upon these factors, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to
this issue. The Department's actions simply do not violate the provisions of UAPA which do not

~ This statute is commonly referred to as the Utah Administrative Procedures Act or UAPA.
Burr & Clark v. Corrections, 7 CSRB 69
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apply to internal personnel actions, nor is there evidence that Executive Director Haun acted
arbitrarily or inconsistently in denying Appellants' grievance.
DECISION
After careful review of the entire evidentiary record, the Board believes that the Hearing
Officer's findings of fact relevant to address the legal issues raised by Appellants in their Brief on
Appeal, are reasonable, rational and supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, it is clear that the
Hearing Officer correctly applied the relevant statutes, policies and rules to the relevant facts of this
case. Finally, the Board believes that the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision was reasonable and
rational based upon the relevant findings and correct application of the law.
After thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record and studying the issued raised by
Appellants before this Board, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision for the
reasons set forth herein and hereby denies Appellants' appeal to this Board.

DATED this 22nd day of December 2003,
DECISION UNANIMOUS
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair
Joan M, Gallegos, Member
Felix J. McGowan, Member
Dale L. Whittle, Member

Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair
Career Service Review Board

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision and final agency action
by complying with Utah Administrative Code , R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63~46b-13, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act
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Exhibit G

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

CRAIG BURR and
LOWELL H. CLARK,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
DECISION AND ORDER

Grievants,

UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Case No. 18 CSRB/ELO. 259
Hearing Officer: J. Francis Vale rga

Agency.

THE STEP 5 HEARING TO DETERMINE the above-entitled matter was held on/ ugust 14
and 15, 2002, Conference Room 1120, State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah,
before J. Francis Valerga, Career Service Review Board Hearing Officer. Craig Burr and I owell H.
Clark (Grievants), were present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law. rQie Utah
Department of Corrections (Agency and UDC), was represented by Patrick B. Nolan, \ssistant
Attorney General. David Salazar was present as the Agency representative. A certif ed court
reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings. Witnesses were placed under oath. T istimony
and documentary evidence were received into the record. The Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer,
Utah Code, Section 63-46b-2(l)(h) (2002), now makes and enters the following:
AUTHORITY
The authority of the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to hold this Step 5 T earing is
found at Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406 (2002) and Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1-1 et seq.
(2002).
ISSUES
Are Grievants entitled to prevail in their salary grievance? If so, what is the appropriateremedy?

FINDINGS OF FACT
Stipulated Facts 1
1. Grievants Burr and Clark are career service employees and were career service er lployees
at the time of filing the grievance on or about May 28,1998. Both Grievants are presently employed
by the Utah Department of Corrections. They are both assigned to the Gunnison Prison.
2. Both Grievants are seekmg a four-step increase which they allege will compensate them
in a manner consistent with others who have equal or less education and/or experience.
3. Since he filed his grievance, Grievant Burr has received the following step inc 'eases:
27 June 1998, Merit to Step 51
27 June 1998, ASI to Step 52
26 June 1999. Merit to Step 53
26 June 1999, ASI to Step 55
24 June 2000, ASI to Step 56
23 June 2001, Merit to Step 57
23 June 2001, ASI to Step 58
1 June 2002, no increase
Since the filing of the grievance, Grievant Burr has received 8 step increases.
4. Since Grievant Clark filed his grievance, he has received the following step increases:
27 June 1998, Merit to Step 50
27 June 1998, ASI to Step 51
26 June 1999, Merit to Step 52
26 June 1999, ASI to Step 54
24 June 2000, ASI to Step 55
23 June 2001, Merit to Step 56
23 June 2001, ASI to Step 57
Since the filing of the grievance, Grievant Clark has received 8 step increases.
5. The Step 4 Final Order denying the grievance was signed by the Executive Director on
18 July 2000.
6. Grievant Burr has a Bachelors Degree in Business Management
7. As of April 2001, William Carlson had occupied the position of Captain for 4i months.
8. As of April 2001, Grievant Burr was earning $20.72 an hour. As of June 2001, and
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Grievant Burr is earning $21.88 an hour.

The stipulated facts herein are written exactly as submitted by the parties at the Step 5 hearing. The only
exception is some minor editing by the Hearing Ofncer for the purpose of maintaining internal consistency with the
rest of the Decision, Style changes were not made.
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9. As of April 2001, Grievant Clark was earning $20.17 an hour. As of June 2001, and
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Grievant Clark is earning $21.29 an hour.
10. As of April 2001, Mr. Carlson was earning $23.09 an hour. As of June 2001, and
through the date of the Step 5 Hearing, Mr. Carlson is earning $24.38 an hour.
11. Grievant Burr was hired by the Agency in September 1990.
12. Grievant Burr made grade 25 in May 1991.
13. Grievant Clark was hired by the Agency in November 1983.
14. Grievant Clark made grade 25 in June 1993.
15. Mr. Carlson was hired by the Agency in October 199116. Mr. Carlson made grade 25 in September 1993.
17. Randall Keven Harr was hired by the Agency in June 1990.
18. Mr. Harr made grade 26 in September 1993.
19. Mr. Harr was making in excess of $25.00 an hour as of January 2001.
Facts Found at the Hearing
20. At the time Grievant Burr filed his grievance in May 1998, he held the position of
Correctional Captain with a salary range between steps 47 and 64. He was being paid at ste p 5 0, and
became a Captain in April 1992.
21. At the time Grievant Clark filed his grievance in May 1998, he held the position of
Correctional Captain with a salary range between steps 47 and 64. He was being paid at step 49, and
became a Captain in June 1993.
22. Unlike Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr do not have college
degrees.
23. Both Grievants have been transferred by Agency management between the po sitions of
IPC, SS HI, and Captain since becoming Captains.2
24. The salary ranges for the positions of IPC, SS III, and Captain are all the same, i.e.,
steps 47 through 64.
25. While the positions of PC, SS in, and Captain have been treated over the years
somewhat interchangeably, they are not all Captain positions because their functions are different.

2

The terms "IPC," USS III," and "Captain" as defined in the Step 5 Hearing stand for Coirectior al
Institution Program Coordinator, Correctional Support Services Supervisor III, and Correctional Captain,
respectively.
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26. The positions of IPC, SS HI, and Captain are all on the same level of the Agency's
organizational chart.
27. The Agency has on occasion addressed pay inequity issues by granting admir istrative
salary increases (ASFs) as provided for in administrative rule R477-7-4(l 1). One of the ASFs
previously granted was a seven- step increase given to an employee named Braithwaite at or about
the time the ASFs requested by Grievants were denied.
28. The positions of IPC, SS III, and Captain are benchmarked to the correctors officer
position.
29. Notwithstanding the fact that different positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years,
performance evaluations, and career paths might potentially account for the differences in pay
between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson, and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons were
identified for the differences in pay.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The burden of proof in non-disciplinary grievances is on the person brirging the
grievance. Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (2000), Therefore, since this is anon-disciplinary
grievance, Grievants have the burden of proof.
2. The standard used to determine whether Grievants have met their burden of proof, is
"substantial evidence." Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406(2)(c) (2000). Therefore, Grievants must
prove the allegations in their grievance by substantial evidence.
3. "Substantial evidence" means "more than a mere scintilla of evidence," but less than "the
weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is such quantum and type of "relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Zissi v. State Tax
Commission, 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992); Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 116 P. 2d 63, 68
(Utah App. 1989).
4. The evidence in this case shows that Grievants have received all salary increases to which
they were entitled by law and are being compensated fairly based upon their experience, education
and longevity.
5. The granting or denying of an ASI in accordance with Utah Administrate

Code,

R477-7-4(l 1) is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head.
6. The denial by the then executive director, Pete Haun, of the ASFs sought by Grievants
under R477-7-4(l 1) was neither arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion.
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.O.259
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7. The Agency has not violated Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 6749-12 (3)0), or
67-19-3.1 of the Utah State Personnel Management Act by its actions in this case because the
responsibility for enforcing and carrying out those statutes belongs to the Department of Human
Resource Management and the Agency cannot undertake functions which are reserved by law to
another agency.
8. Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a) and (b) do not mean that employees who have
similar education and experience and who are classified the same because they do the same work,
must receive the same salaries. They mean such employees must have the same salary ranges.
9. The decision to deny an ASI at Step 4 of the State Grievance and Appeals Procedure is
an internal personnel action, and is therefore exempt from the provisions of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act in accordance with Utah Code, Section 63-46b-l(2).
THE GRIEVANTS* CASE
Grievants argue that they are the victims of a pay inequity in that two other Agency
employees in their same job classification do the same work they do but are paid more.3 Grievants
claim that suchpay inequity violates three state statutes, to wit: Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a),
67-19-12 (3)(b), and 67-19-3.1 (l)(b). The three statutes read in pertinent part as follow*'.:
The director shall prepare, maintain, and revise a position
classification plan for each employee position not exempted under
Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for equal work. Utah Code,
67-19-12 (3)(a).
Classification of positions shall be based upon similarity of duties
performed and responsibilities assumed, so that the same job
requirements and the same salary range may be applied equitably to
each position in the same class. Utah Code, 67-19-12 (3)(b).
The department shall establish a career service system designed in a
manner that will provide for the effective implementation of the
following merit principles:
. • . .providing for equitable and competitive compensation. Utah
Code, §6749-3.1 (l)(b).

The two employees with whom Grievants compare themselves are William Carlson and Randall Keven
Hair. Grievants Burr and Clark make $21.88 and S21.29 respectively, while Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr m ike S2438
and over $25.00 respectively. As set forth in rinding no, 29, many factors could account for the difference s in pay,
but no specific reasons were pointed out by either side. Since Grievants bear the burden of proof in this c ise} it was
incumbent on them to put forth more evidence on that issue.
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.O. 259
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Furthermore, Grievanf s argue, a mechanism exists that would allow the Agency to remedy
the pay inequity. That mechanism is an ASI as provided for in R477-7-4 (11)

The AS." rule, as

it existed when the grievances were filed, read in pertinent part as follows:
(11) Administrative Salary Increase
The executive director or commissioner authorizes and approves
Administrative Salary increases under the following parameters:
(c) Justifications for Administrative Salary Increases shall be:
***

(iii) Supported by issues such as: special agency conditions or
problems, equity issues, or other unique situations or considerations
in the agency. (Emphasis supplied).
Grievants argue that the then executive director, Pete Haun, used the rule tc grant a
seven-step ASI to an employee named Braithwaite while contemporaneously denying the r request
for four-step ASFs. Grievants argue that while the granting of an ASI is discretionary with the
Agency director, the denial of their ASFs was arbitrary and capricious in view of the ASI granted
to Braithwaite.
As support for their argument, Grievants cite a provision in the Utah Admi listrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) that addresses the circumstances under which a party can seek judi :ial relief
from an administrative agency. The provision in question reads as follows:
(h) [relief can be granted when] the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency }s prior practice, unless the
agencyjustifies the inconsistency by givingfacts and reason
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency^ or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. (Emphasis supplied).
Utah Code, 63-46(b)-16(4)(h) (1997).
Quoting from a portion of footnote 12 in Grievant's Posthearing Brief Grievant's state:
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"Haun cannot (consistent with merit principles) grant an ASI to one employee so as to remedy a pay
inequity and then deny another employee's request on the sole basis that he has discretion to do so
under DHRM rules."
Anticipating the Agency's reliance on a long line of PRB and CSRB cases dem/ing pay
inequity grievances, Grievants argue that: (a) the doctrine of stare decisis (reliance on previous case
law) does not apply to administrative proceedings; and (b) even if stare decisis does apply, their
case is distinguishable from those previous pay inequity cases because it involves the violation of
the above-mentioned statutes.
THE AGENCY'S CASE
The Agency responds to Grievanfs case by arguing that:4 (a) the doctrine of stare decisis
does apply to administrative proceedings, and thus, the long line of PRB and CSRB cases denying
pay inequity grievances does apply in this case;5 (b) the granting of an ASI under R477-7-4(l 1) is
discretionary with the executive director, and the decision denying the AST s requested by Grievants
in this case was not an abuse of that discretion; and (c) the Agency did not violate the statutes cited
by Grievants because the Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM), not UDC, is
responsible for carrying out those statutes.
In short, the Agency argues that Grievants received all salary increases to which they were
entitled, and are being paid appropriately, considering their experience, education, and 1 Dngevity.
Any other increase could only come as an ASI pursuant to R477-7-4(l 1). ASFs, by law, cam be
denied or granted at the discretion of the Agency executive director. The Agency argues that the
decision by the executive director denying the ASI's was a proper exercise of discretion, and thus,
the grievance should be denied.
DISCUSSION
My analysis of this matter will be broken down into three areas: previous pay inequity cases;
statutes; and administrative rule.

The Agency raised additional arguments in its pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, but the three
arguments set forth above are representative of all their arguments.
The pay inequity cases cited by the Agency include the following: CC Patel v. Division of
Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991): Lund v Division of Health Care Financing, 3 PRB 24 (1987); and
Division of Environmental Health v. Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15 (1984).
Burr and Clark v Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.O. 259
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Previous Pay Inequity Cases
Pay inequity grievances have traditionally not fared well in the State's career service system,
whether decided by the Career Service Review Board (CSRB), or its predecessor body - the
Personnel Review Board (PRB).
In reviewing a pay inequity case on appeal from Step 5 as early as 1984, the PRB \acated a
hearing officer's decision that had awarded a two-step increase based on pay inequity. After
discussing the legal definition of the term "equity/' the PRB held, "[e]quity alone . . . is not a
controlling principle upon which employment relations5 remedies are conditioned." Drnsion of
Environmental Health v. Pitkin andSudweeks, 2 PRB 15, 8 (1984).
Three years later in another pay inequity case, Lund v. Division of Health Care Financing,
3 PRB 24 (1987), the PRB quoted as follows from its previous decision in Pitkin, "[w]hm and if
cases are determined on the basis of 'equity' alone, they may not be dispositive to legally sound or
logically reasoned decision-making." Pitkin at 8, The PRB went on to say;
[T]here will likely always exist salary inequities for some employees
given the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring
practices, its change in philosophies by different administrations and
department executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel
rules in order to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for
other germane reasons that need not be included herein. Lund at 8.
Since then, the CSRB has followed Lund in pay inequity cases. For example, in C C Patel
•v. Division of Environmental Health, 4 CSRB 37 (1991), the Board referred to Lund and said:
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same
job title are paid at the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not
contemplate identical pay rates for similarly situated employees
because variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in
employees' salaries result from such factors and conditions as
promotions, career mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit
money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost
of living adjustments (COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry
rates (creating salary compression), length of service, long-term
leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings [sic],
reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job-related factors.
PateUt9.
In their post hearing briefs, Grievants try valiantly to challenge the application of these pay
inequity decisions to their case. Their challenge is waged primarily on two fronts: (a) that the
doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in administrative proceedings, and therefore, prioi-PRB and
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.0.259

Page8

CSRB cases are irrelevant in this proceeding; and (b) that Lund and Pitkin are distinguishable
because they are based on equity alone, while their case involves the violation of three state statutes.
In my opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis does apply in this proceeding. I find the cases
cited by the Agency on this issue to be persuasive. In Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held:
We have previously stated that stare decisis has limited applicability
to administrative agency cases, see Williams v. Public Serv. Comm }n.
754 P.2d 41, 52 (Utah 1988), but that is because of the innumerable
kinds of decisions that administrative agencies make. This limitation
does not apply where administrative law making is done pursuant
to formal procedures similar to those employed in judicial
proceedings. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis supplied.) 846 P.2d at
1252.
Furthermore, the holding in Mountain States was upheld by the Court in Steiner Corp. v.
AuditingDiv. of the Utah State Tax Comm '*, 979 P.2d 357 (Utah 1999). The Court saic:
Mountain States [cited above] held that rules established in formal
agency adjudications have the force of stare decisis in future agency
decisions. [Citation omitted.]
Mountain States stands for the proposition that it would be arbitrary
and capricious for an agency to apply a different rule of law in a
future case with similar facts. See id. at 1252. It is as arbitrary and
capricious to apply the same law to the same facts and reach a
different result as it is to apply a different rule in a factually similar
situation. Simply put "Stare decisis means that like facts will receive
like treatment in a court of law." [Citations omitted.] The holding of
an agency adjudication, or the application of a rule of law to the facts
in that case, binds an agency in subsequent decisions under Mountain
States. 979P.2dat36L
I think Mountain States is good law here because administrative law making before the
CSRB "is done pursuant to formal procedures similar to those employed injudicial proceedings.''
846 P.2d at 1252. The fact that the CSRB has no administrative rule mandating that Step 5 hearing
officers are bound by Step 6 CSRB decisions or other Step 5 decisions issued by other hearing
officers is not persuasive.
Statutes
Grievants also attempt to distinguish their case from prior pay inequity cases decided by the
PRB and CSRB by arguing their case involves more than just a pay inequity. Grievants claim the
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.O. 259
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additional issue in their case is the violation of three statures in the Utah State Personnel
Management Act. Those statutes are Utah Code, Sections 67-19-12 (3)(a), 67-19-12 (3)(b), and 6719-3.1.1 find their argument unpersuasive for three reasons.
First, the responsibility for enforcing and carrying out the statutes in question belongs to
DHRM, not to UDC. The term "Department" is defined in Section 67-19-3(7) to mean DHRM.
Thus, where Section 67-19-3.1, charges the department with the responsibility of establishing a
career service system that will provide for "equitable and competitive compensation/' the
responsibility lies with DHRM, not UDC. Similarly, the term "director" as it is used ii Section
67-19-12(3)(a), refers to the DHRM director, not to the UDC director, because, in accordance with
Section 67-19-8, it is DHRM, not UDC, that is tasked with the responsibility of designing and
administering the state pay plan and classification system. Thus the responsibility to "prepare,
maintain, and revise a position classification plan for each employee position... to provide equal
pay for equal work" belongs to the DHRM director, not the UDC director. The foregoing analysis
is supported by Section 67-19-9(2) which limits the role of State agencies to one of "recom mending
position classifications and grade allocations." (Emphasis supplied.)
Second, even if the responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and revising the State pay plan
and classification system belonged to UDC, I do not read Sections 67-19-12(3)(a) and (b) the same
way as do Grievants. Grievants read those two subsections as meaning employees who ha\ e similar
education and experience and who are classified the same because they do the same work, r aust have
the same salaries. I read them to mean employees who ate classified the same because ft ey do the
same work must have the same salary ranges, In that regard, while Grievants and the two e nployees
with whom they compare themselves do not have the same salaries, they do have the same salary
ranges.
Third, in addition to not being legally required to pay the same salaries to employees who
have similar education, seniority, and identical classifications, it is impractical to do so. The reasons
for that are set forth in Patel, Lund, and Pitkin. They include such factors as promotions, career
mobility assignments, varying amounts of merit money increases, legislatively imposed statewide
salary freezes, cost of living adjustments, length of service, long term leaves of absence, interrupted
service and rehires, reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job related factors.
In short, even though Grievants argue that their case involves more than "equity alone," I do
not agree with their argument alleging statutory violations.
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.O, 259
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AdministrativeRuIe
Grievants argue that R477-7-4(ll) provides the remedy to correct their pay inequity.
Grievanf s argument in this regard is set forth above in the presentation of the Agency's case and will
not be restated here. I disagree with Grievanf s argument for two reasons.
First, the granting of an ASI is not mandatory. It is discretionary with the agency head.
R477-7-11(11) states: "The agency head . . , is the final authority for salary actions witliin these
guidelines. The agency head . . . shall answer any challenge or grievance resulting from an
administrative salary increase." Id Therefore, even though one of the justifications set fo th in the
ASI rule is "equity reasons," an executive director may choose not to use it.
In. Lopez v. Career Service Review Board, 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992), the court said:
Discretionary personnel powers granted to agencies do not constitute
mandates. Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a
certain benefit, the employee may not demand it as a matter of right.
Id. at 574,
Grievants attempt to distinguish their case from Lopez by arguing that their case involves
a "statutory mandate" while Lopez does not. Grievants state:
[W]hen there is a statutory mandate, the Legislature creates an
entitlement and a right in the employee. Such a right is created by the
three (3) provisions contained in the USPMA . . . and no additional
violation of rules needs to be proven by Grievants. Grievants'
Posthearing Brief at 14 and 15.
However, as stated previously in this decision, I do not agree that the three USPMA statutes
constitute a mandate in favor of Grievants. Accordingly, I find that Lopez does apply in this case.
Second, Grievants argue that the Agency's granting of an ASI to Mr. Braithwaite, while
contemporaneously denying their ASI request, was arbitrary and capricious because it was
inconsistent. In support of their argument, Grievants cite Section 63-46b-16 (4)(h)(iii) o ""the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) which provides for relief if the agency action is.
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies
the inconsistency by giving facts and reason that demonstrate a fair
and rational basis for the inconsistency.
I believe Grievanf s reliance on UAPA is misplaced.

In addressing the 5 cope and

applicability of UAPA, Section 63-46b-l (2) reads as follows:
(2) This chapter does not govern:
Burr and Clark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.0 259
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* * *

(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions
within an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review
of those actions, (Emphasis supplied).
Proceedings at Steps 5 and 6 of the grievance procedure are not internal personnel actions
and for that reason UAPA does apply to matters heard at that level However, the decision by the
then executive director, Pete Harm, to deny Grievanf s request for ASF s, was a Step 4 deci sion, i.e.,
an internal agency personnel action, and is therefore exempt from the provisions of UAP \..6
DECISION
For the foregoing reasons, the grievance should be? and hereby is denied.
DATED this 13th day of December 2002.

icis Valerga
' Hearing/Presiding Officer
Career Service Review Board

RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration nrnst be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b).
APPEAL
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).

For that reason it is not necessary to address in depth the case of Pickett v. Utah Department of
Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1993) which Gnevants rely on to claim that they met their initial butien of
establishing a prima facie case of inconsistent treatment. Gnevants argue that because they met their initLil burden,
the burden shifted to the Agency to demonstrate a "iair and rational** basis for the Agency's so called inconsistent
treatment Admittedly Director Harm's final order did not specifically address why Mr. Braithwaite's AS v was
granted while Gnevant's ASI's were denied. However, his final order does indicate in the fourth paragraph on page
1 that any comparisons outside the rank of captain would be comparing "apples to oranges." That reference, coupled
with the fact that Mr. Braithwaite is a licensed professional pharmacist, rather than a captain, arguably explains
Director Haun's reason for treating them differently. Moreover, characterizing the granting of a single ASI as a
'"prior practice" may be stretching the meaning of the word "practice." No evidence was submitted regarding how
many ASI's were denied.
Burr andClark v. Corrections, 18 CSRB/H.0.259
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Executive Director
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HR Manager
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HR Director
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STATE OF UTAH

BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD

In the Matter of the Appeal of:
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH,
Appellant,
v.

D E C I S I O N

JAY B. PITKIN and
CALVIN K. SUDWEEKS,
Respondents.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing, pursuant to
notification, on Friday, August 31, 1984 at 10:00 AM, in the Governor's Board
Room, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utahthe Personnel Review Board ("Board") were present:

The following members of
Peter Fillmore, Acting

Chairman; Marguerite L. Horton; Dalmas H. Nelson and Jose L. Trujillo.
Absent:

Anita C. Bradford.

The Division of Environmental Health ("Appellant") was represented by
Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Tax and Business
Regulation Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General.

Jay B. Pitkin and

Calvin K. Sudweeks ("Respondents") were represented by Jamis M. Johnson,
Attorney at Law with Fabian & Clendenin, which firm represents the Utah Public
Employees' Association.

Mr. Pitkin was present; Mr. Sudweeks was absent.

Karen Suzuki-Hashimoto, Director, and Felix McGowan, Bureau Manager, both of
the Division of Personnel Management ("DPM"), were also present, as interested
persons.
A court reporter made a verbatim record of the appeal hearing before this
Board, which has not been transcribed to date.

This matter is properly before the Board which has appellate jurisdiction
pursuant to the Utah State Personnel Management Act, as found at Utah Code
Ann. Sections 67-19-20 through 67-19-25, 1953, as amended, (1983 Supp.), and
the Board*s own regulatory provisions published as the State Employees*
Grievance and Appeals Procedure (1983 ed.).
Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks (hereinafter "Respondents") advanced their
respective grievances to a Step 5 evidentiary hearing•

However, the Division

afterwards appealed the evidentiary determination to the Board at Step 6.

On

appeal the Division now shoulders the burdens of proof and persuasion.
The Board has reviewed Hearing Officer Lawrence Epperson's ("Hearing
Officer") Step 5 decision along with both parties1 briefs. Also, the Board
members have reviewed the transcript of John Gisler's testimony as well as the
main volume of the Step 5 transcript.

The Board took the matter under

advisement following oral arguments on August 31 and met in an extended
executive session. No decision was reached at that time. Board members
subsequently reconvened in an executive session on Wednesday, October 10,
1984. The Board, being duly apprised in the facts and issues of the case ! s
premises, now makes the following conclusions and decision.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This matter consumed considerable time in getting to Step 6 for the
following reasons: Calvin K. Sudweeks filed his grievance on July 18, 1983;
Jay B. Pitkin filed his grievance on August 2, 1983. Early on, as of October
27, 1983, both grievances were consolidated pursuant to Section 1.0 of the
Board's rules, due to similar wording and the essential issue being identical
in both cases.
For a period the appeal was placed in abeyance from September 20 through
October 7, 1983, while salary survey data were being gathered by DPM.

A Step

5 hearing was requested on October 19, 1983 by Mr. Pitkin. The Board's
Executive Secretary scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 14, which
was continued per request to December 5, continued again to January 16, 1984,
with an additional continuance requested thereafter.
had by now requested continuances-

Both parties1 counsel

Therefore, the Executive Secretary

continued the hearing but without setting another specific hearing date.

Respondents' counsel requested subpoenas for the taking of depositions on
-January 16 from John Gisler, Director, DPM and Robert Haywood, Personnel
Manager, Department of Health ("Department").

Following the taking of

depositions, the Step 5 hearing was re-scheduled for and held on March 5,
1984. The Hearing Officer subsequently issued his Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Decision on March 22.
A timely appeal by the Division was made on April 12. Also, the Agency
requested a Remand Session before the Hearing Officer. A Remand Session was
then scheduled for May 7. However, in a letter under date of April 18,
Respondents1 counsel expressed his interest in resisting a remand depending
upon which issues the Division desired to have clarified by the Hearing
Officer. Subsequently, on May 1, Respondents1 counsel submitted a formal
request to deny a Remand Session before the Hearing Officer, even suggesting
placing of oral arguments before the Executive Secretary on this procedural
aspect. Additionally, Respondents1 counsel's letter provided six compelling
reasons for not remanding the Step 5 decision to the Hearing Officer for
clarification purposes, as requested by the Division*
Effective May 7, the Executive Secretary re-designated the then-scheduled
Remand Session as a "Clarification Conference" which was to be conducted off
the record.

This change in format provided the Division with an informal

opportunity to receive clarification and to make inquiry anent the Step 5
decision, but allowed the original Step 5 decision to remain intact, as
desired by the Respondents. Following the May 7 Clarification Conference the
Agency pursued its previously-initiated appeal to Step 6.

The main transcript

was produced after several weeks. After delivery of the transcript,
Appellant's counsel requested a three-day extension in filing his brief.
Respondents* counsel also delayed in submitting his brief.

After briefs were

received by August 16 and mailed to Board members, the Step 6 appeal hearing
was then scheduled for and held on August 31, with deliberation concluded on
October 10.
The above summary accounts for the longer-than-usual lapse of time in
processing Messrs. Pitkinfs and Sudweeksr appeal to the Board.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is a synopsis of events which gave rise to the present
appeal.

Effective September 19, 1981 Mr, Pitkin received a two-grade salary
increase (Grade 27 Step 11 to Grade 29 Step 11) with his new position title of
Assistant Bureau Director,

In November, 1981 Pitkin received a one-step

increase which placed him at 29/12.

Also, on the fourteenth of that same

month, Don Ostler, a subordinate Section Chief, received a salary increase
from Grade 27 Step 11 to 27/15 through the support of the Department's
Executive Director, Dr. James 0. Mason.
Ostler was attracted to the prospect of self-employment.

In order to

retain Ostler's services for the State, Dr. Mason obtained approval from DPM
Director John Gisler to increase Ostler's salary by four steps, even though
this extended Ostler's salary beyond the official pay plan by three steps.
Ostler's salary at 27/15 (extended range) now equalled Pitkin's at 29/12.

One

year later, specifically on November 13, 1982, Ostler received a one-step
increase to 27/16, presumably an annual performance step increase, which
caused his salary to then exceed that of Mr. Pitkin's.
There matters rested until February 4, 1983 when Fred Pehrson, another of
the four Section Chiefs subordinate to Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks, submitted
a formal grievance. Pehrsonfs gravamen focused on management's failure to
recognize his increased administrative duties for which he had not been fully
compensated during the past two years; and, additionally, no salary
differential existed between Perhson's salary and that of his subordinates who
were also at Grade 27, averred Pehrson.
After Pehrsonfs grievance progressed through Step 4 without resolution,
the Board's Executive Secretary applied the then just-enacted 1983 legislation
to create a special Classification Appeals Panel("Panel") to determine the
proper classification for Pehrson!s position.

On May 11, 1983 the panel

issued its unanimous findings and recommendations. The Hearing Officer took
note of and quoted a portion of the panel's "Determinations" in his Step 5
Decision, pp.3-4.
27/15.

Thus, Pehrson's salary was increased from Grade 27/12 to

Also the other three Section Chiefs —

Ostler, Reichert and Hinshaw

received salary increases to 27/18, 27/10 and 27/13 respectively.
Implementation of the aforementioned salary increases, through extending the
range as opposed to advancing the grade level, generated the present
grievances by Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks who each asserted that the Section
Chiefs' grade levels should have been increased, rather than their salary
ranges being extended.

—

ISSUE:

Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks each submitted separate grievance statements
which contained similar but not identical wording. While Sudweeks referred to
"serious" salary inequities, Pitkin wrote of "significant" salary inequities.
Both gentlemen stated their respective opinion that it was inappropriate for
Department management to have extended the salary range of subordinate Bureau
Program Managers (previously designated as "Section Chiefs") through step
increments in lieu of placement on higher salary grades*

As director of the

Water Pollution Control Bureau, Mr. Sudweeks noted that the salary of one of
his subordinate Program Managers had recently been adjusted to where it not
only exceeded his own but, in fact, had become equivalent to the highest step
of his own Bureau Director position's grade. Similarly, Mr. Pitkin, as
Assistant Bureau Director, observed that another Program Manager's salary now
exceeded his own, which was then at the highest step of his (Pitkin's)
position's grade.
Essentially, both gentlemen complained that subordinate Program Managers'
salaries now equalled or exceeded their respective salaries.
Both Manager-Respondents stated that the proper remedy to correct this
perceived salary inequity should be an appropriate salary adjustment to their
own salaries.
Due to the similarity of Messrs. Pitkin's and Sudweek's gravamen, the
respective grievances were consolidated into one appeal prior to Step 5 with
the following issue/question then being placed before the Hearing Officer for
determination:
Have the Appellants [i.e., Pitkin and Sudweeks]
been subjected to a serious salary inequity as
the result of a salary adjustment to a
subordinate Program Manager in the Bureau of
Water Pollution Control?
And,
If so, what is the appropriate remedy?
In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer concluded in the affirmative
that Respondents had been subjected to a serious salary inequity and that the
proper remedy was to award them each a two-step salary increase retroactive to
April 12, 1983. An added proviso by the Hearing Officer was that these two

steps would remain in effect only until the implementation of a
then-forthcoming "Engineering Classification Compensation Study" which was to
be promulgated by DPM on or after March 28, 1984.

DISCUSSION:
When Don Ostler received a one-time, 4-step salary increase from Grade 27
Step 11 to 27/15 a two-fold, unprecedented action occurred:

Preferential

treatment began in the form of a salary increase of four steps at one time
(whereas one or two steps are permissible); and second, Ostler was permitted
to exceed the State pay plan's maximum step for his grade by an additional
three steps. That matter is not justiciable but it is troubling along with
being unprecedented.

Further, the four-step-at-one-time-action is vexing

because the salary increase went only to one person (Ostler) —
concession, outside the ambit of the rules and regulations —

as a special
rather than to a

class of positions (Section Chiefs) — and because the action was later
replicated in the case of Pehrson1s grievance wherein the Department chose to
increase Pehrson's salary by three steps, with Hinshaw, Reichert and Ostler
each receiving two steps, rather than raising their grade from 27 to 29.

Of

those four Section Chiefs, three were in extended salary ranges which exceeded
the maximum:

Ostler at 18; Hinshaw at 13, and Pehrson at 15.

Notwithstanding

Exh. R-2 (Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-12), neither the statute nor the DPM
rules provided for instances where the authorized State pay plan may be
exceeded.

Hence the unusual precedent which began when Ostler received his

4-step increase in 1981 through the extension of his salary range from Step 11
to 15, continued as he progressed to 16, and finally to Step 18. Concededly,
if Ostler had not been reclassified to Grade 30 on October 1, 1983, he might
now be continuing to progress toward Step 24 or further.

Such individualized

preferential salary treatment may appear to provide fiscal flexibility to
retain valuable employees for the State, but such an action does not comport
with a merit system structure where all State employees are to be treated
according to established rules.

When an employee (as opposed to a class or

classes of positions such as those described in the Board*s USH Local #50
Decision), receives what appears to be preferential treatment, there is at
least the suggestion of favoritism ~ whether warranted or not.

The statute states that "the waiting periods between steps shall be the
same for all grades."

(Section 67-19-12(c)) Such language appears to take

preference over DPM rule 2.c.(l)(1983 ed.) which states in part:

"The

Director may authorize special exceptions to provisions of these rules when
permitted by law . . . ."

Ostler was treated differently from the other

Section Chiefs and from Pitkin and Sudweeks anent the waiting period between
steps, Mr. Gisler testified that subordinates might receive more salary
(i.e., annual) than their supervisors based upon any one of three factors:
(1) seniority/longevity, (2) individual performance, or (3) labor market
conditions-

(Gisler T. pp. 4-6)

Items 1 and 2 were not used to justify

OstlerTs 4-step increase. And if item 3 justified Ostlerfs 4-step increase
then those others in the same class of position (Section Chiefs Hinshaw,
Pehrson and Reichert) should have received step increases also.

Instead,

Ostler was treated individually and preferentially.
Because reclassification of all the Department's Engineering position
titles and grades occurred effective October 1, 1983, which subsequently
advanced the four Section Chiefs to Grade 30, Pitkin to Grade 32 and Sudweeks
to Grade 33, the propriety of Ostler, Pehrson and Hinshaw previously exceeding
the pay plan's maximum limit is now mooted.

However, it is a highly

questionable practice for DPM to exceed the Legislatively-approved pay plan on
the basis of individualized, preferential treatment rather than on the basis
of classification and/or authenticated salary data.
Counsel for Respondents has urged that some consideration be given to
Messrs. Pitkin's and Sudweek's commendable job performances.
Officer, for example, stated in Finding of Fact No. 7:
that Director Sudweeks has received Outstanding

1

The Hearing

"In spite of the fact

performance reviews annually

over the past many years, he has received only one salary step increase in the
last six and a half years." Respondents1 counsel stated in his brief (p.2)
that Sudweeks and Pitkin

"are outstanding employees with virtually perfect

performance evaluations for every performance period of their entire
careers." However, the basis of this appeal does not rest upon job
performance as a critical factor, nor even as a relevant one. The Panel
determined that Section Chief Pehrson had been inaccurately classified for
approximately two years, that he should have been at a "supervisory
classification level," which should have translated to "approximately 10%
higher than the working level [Engineer] grade 27 position . . . ." Hence,

the threshold issue is one of proper classification and its corresponding
salary level —

not job performance.

Albeit, the Board agrees with

Respondents in that grades of Section Chiefs — not step or range extensions
—

should have been adjusted pursuant to the Pehrson classification Panel! s

determination; job performance, however, is not a factor of any consequence in
this appeal, DPM has had rules in place for the past few years which provide
for regular salary increases based upon annual performance appraisals for
standard or above standard performances.

CONCLUSIONS:
The Hearing Officer determined that, "The [Respondents] have been
subjected to a serious inequity as a result of a salary adjustment to a
subordinate Program Manager in the Bureau of Water Pollution Control,"

The

Hearing Officer thus concluded that Pitkin and Sudweeks are entitled, "as a
matter of equity," (Decision, p. 5) to the same two-step salary increase
consideration which was given to the four Section Chiefs who were reclassified
to Program Managers.

(Emphasis added.) Appellant's counsel is correct in

stating that the Hearing Officer lacked a "legal basis" on which to rule in
favor of the Manager-Respondents.

The Board finds that the Hearing Officer's

rationale of a two-step increase for Respondents, based upon "a matter of
equity," is unwarranted and hereby vacates the Step 5 determination.
A decision which orders a two-step salary adjustment to direct-line
supervisors predicated soley upon a rationale premised on "a matter of equity"
is unwarranted in the instant case by the facts. Reclassification of State
employees is a rather common occurrence.

Had the four Section Chiefs been

reclassified downwards, that would not be grounds for the Hearing Officer to
reason that the two Manager-Respondents should also be correspondingly
downgraded. Therefore, whether the four subordinates were reclassified up or
down in grade level does not constitute a sufficient nexus to similarly adjust
the salaries of their supervisors, Pitkin and Sudweeks; at least not on the
grounds of so-called "equity".

Equity in the legal meaning denotes "the

spirit and habit of fairness, justice and right dealing which would regulate
the intercourse of men with men."

(Black's Law Dictionary , p. 484, 5th ed.)

Equity alone, however, is not a controlling principle upon which employment
relations' remedies are conditioned.

More Importantly, the Panel's Pehrson determination was that Pehrson (and
by association the other three Bureau Section Chiefs) had "been
inappropriately classified" for at least two years and therefore the Panel set
a new, appropriate classification title and grade level, that of Program
Manager, Grade 29 (which was to be applied until DPM's salary survey results
took effect on October 1, 1983).

The Pehrson matter, then, was not merely a

salary adjustment but comprised a reclassification action which encompassed a
salary adjustment. Messrs. Pitkin and Sudweeks are not entitled to a salary
adjustment merely because their subordinates received one. They must show
that they were improperly classified when they commenced their grievances.
The threshold issue is classification, not preferential salary adjustments nor
even "equity" adjustments.
The roots of this appeal have their beginnings in the various Department,
Division and Bureau organizational studies, proposals and recommendations for
structural reorganization and reclassification, especially including the
Department's Blue Ribbon Reorganization Committee's report of 1980. Exh. A-3
relates some past efforts to treat the dual problems of organizational
structure and classification within the Department, the Division and the
Bureau. That material has probity value in showing that classification and
organizational structure problems existed within the Water Pollution Bureau
long before Sudweeks and Pitkin, or even Pehrson, initiated their respective
grievances.
It is rather deplorable that not until the advent of the grievances of
Pehrson, Pitkin and Sudweeks were DPM and the Department sufficiently
motivated (or provoked) into resolving the quite longstanding problems of
structural organization, classification and compensation within the Division
of Environmental Health.
The Pehrson Panel observed that the classification specifications for
Public Health Engineers, Grades 21-27, were outdated by eleven to twelve years
as of May, 1983•

Consequently the Panel recommended that the Department in

cooperation with DPM "conduct a full scale classification study and salary
survey" of the entire Division, thus including the Water Pollution Bureau.
The Panel found that Pehrson had been misclassified for some two years at the
"working level" of Public Health Engineer, 27, instead of at the "supervisory
classification level", which, stated the Panel, should have an approximate ten
percent higher salary range for "Chief Section," (now known as Program
Manager) above the "working level"*

That Panel specifically recommended an upgrade from 27 to 29, Steps 1-12
(or, alternatively, Grade 27, steps 4-16).

In addition to Pehrson's pay range

adjustment effective May 14, 1983, the Panel specifically conditioned the
alternative (Grade 27/4-16) so that "no employees will be paid beyond the top
step of the new range" after October 1, 1983.
Considerable weight must be given to Exh. R-l. That document, entitled
"Engineering Classification and Compensation Study", resulted from joint
studies by DPM and the Departments of Health, Natural Resources and
Transportation.

Said document proposed the reclassification of Director,

Environmental Health, Grade 31 (i.e., Sudweeks as Bureau Director) to
Engineering Manager III, Grade 32, and Assistant Director, Environmental
Health, Grade 29 (i.e., Pitkin as Assistant Bureau Director) to Engineering
Manager II, Grade 31. Subsequently, that memo was revised to where
Engineering Manager III was assigned to Grade 33 (Sudweeks) and Engineering
Manager II (Pitkin) was placed at Grade 32, Appellant's brief (p.13) notes
that Messrs. Sudweeks and Pitkin have undergone little, if any, changes in
actual duties and responsibilities either before, during, or after submission
of their grievances. DPM and the Department ultimately reclassified the two
Manager-Respondents to Grades 32/8 and 33/8 retroactive to October 1, 1983.
Therefore it is concluded that Respondents1 job duties and responsibilites
were substantially the same as of October 1, 1983 (the date of the
Department's aforementioned reclassification implementation), as they were at
the time of the grievances being filed, July 18 and August 2, 1983. Hence, if
their compensation level was 33/8 (Sudweeks) and 32/8 (Pitkin) as of October
1, it should have been the same as of July 18 (for Sudweeks) and August 2 (for
Pitkin) and they are entitled to be compensated at those respective levels
retroactively to the dates of filing their respective grievances.
The Board can only take notice of misclassification situations from the
date of a grievance being filed.
The Respondents are found to have been improperly classified between the
dates of their respective grievances (Pitkin/August 2, 1983; Sudweeks/July 18,
1983) and October 1, 1983 when the Department implemented the aforementioned
Engineering Manager class titles and grade levels. Therefore, Messrs. Pitkin
and Sudweeks are entitled to a compensation adjustment from the date of their
respective grievances through September

30, 1983. The amount for Mr. Pitkin

and Mr. Sudweeks is to be based on the difference of what they would have

earned if they had been properly classified at Grades 32/8 and 33/8
respectively and what they actually earned at Grades 29/12 and 31/11 during
the just-described period.
In conclusion, the Department would have acted more wisely in considering
existing State policies touching employee bonus plans and incentive awards in
attempting to retain Ostler's services in 1981 than by exceeding the State's
established pay plan to selectively benefit a single employee.

Second, the

Department exercised poor judgement in extending the Grade 27 range for the
four Program Managers instead of adjusting to Grade 29 and placing them at the
"supervisory level" in the classification/compensation structure pursuant to
the Pehrson Panel's determination.

Exceeding the established steps beyond the

pay plan does not comport with the spirit of the State!s merit program.
Third, both parties have admitted that there are acceptable situations in
which subordinates receive higher salary than their superiors.

Although the

parties both affirmatively argued that issue against each other, essentially
they agreed in principle that rare situations can and do exist where
subordinates may reasonably and properly receive a higher salary than their
supervisors, as based upon justifiable reasons. That issue is now
well-settled.

Finally, there is the question of precedence and its ongoing

effect. Appellant's counsel has hinted that the logical conclusion of the
Hearing Officer's "equity" rationale would be that "every time a subordinate
is given any kind of increase, his superior must be granted a similar
increase."

(Brief, p.17)

If applied literally, that would be undesirable,

perhaps even chaotic. Certainly such an impact would severely hamper State
management's interest in maintaining ongoing efforts to promote an accurate
classification program.

However, as noted previously, the Hearing Officer's

rationale of "equity" salary adjustments is not persuasive.

When subordinates

are reclassified, to the extent that grade compaction and salary compression
result (as it did in this case because of the Pehrson Panel's findings), then
State management is well advised to fully assess those impacts on the working
level relationships between subordinates and supervisors who occupy positions
in the same class series.

In conclusion, the facts and circumstances of this

particular appeal are such that little, if any, precedence would apply to
other non-related cases.

DECISION:

The Step 5 decision is vacated as to Conclusion B and the Hearing
Officer's remedy.

In place thereof, the Board sets forth its own conclusions

and remedy as described in the foregoing "Conclusions".

DATED

this ^jU day of ^ X^Z^J^^X^

, 1984.

DECISION UNANIMOUS.

Peter Fillmore,
Acting Chairman
Utah Personnel Review Board

Robert N. White
Executive Secretary
Utah Personnel Review Board

Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County.
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.
as amended.

Utah Code Ann.

67-19-25(6), 1953,

Exhibit I

BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF:
A. PAUL LUND,
Grievant and Respondent,
D E C I S I O N

v.
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent and Appellant.

Case No. 3 PRB 24

The above-entitled matter came before the Utah Personnel Review Board
("Board") as an appeal hearing, pursuant to notice, on August A, 1987 in the
Governor's Board Room, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. The
following Board members were present: Bruce T. Jones, Chairman; Jean M.
Bishop, David M. Hilbig, and Jose L. Trujillo.

The Division of Health Care Financing was represented by Robert Haywood,
Personnel Manger, Bureau of Personnel, Department of Health ("Department").
A. Paul Lund, originally the grievant at the Step 5 or evidentiary level, was
the respondent at the appellate level. Mr. Lund represented himself in a pro
se capacity.

The Division of Health Care Financing ("Division") in the role

of appellant advanced the case to the Board at Step 6 of the State1s Grievance
Procedure.

A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before the
Board, which, to date, has not been transcribed.

However, the court

reporter's record from the Step 5 or evidentiary level was transcribed into a
one volume transcript.

That transcript was made available to the parties for

the purpose of submitting briefs to the Board and for use in making oral
argument at the appeal hearing.

1.

This case came properly before the Utah Personnel Review Board which has
jurisdiction over the matter on appeal. The Board1s statutory authority is
found within the State Personnel Management Act, expecially Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, sections 67-19-20 through 25.

Therein the Board's

authority and appellate jurisdiction are defined. The Board's regulatory
provisions have been enacted administratively and promulgated as the Grievance
Procedure Rules (1987 ed.)-

Following oral argument before the Board on August 4, the matter was taken
under advisement, and thereafter considered in an executive session.

Being

duly apprised in the facts, rules, and matters of law pertaining to the issues
and premises of the case, the Board now makes and enters the following
findings, conclusions, and decision:

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This matter proceeded regularly through the State employees' Grievance
Procedure. At the evidentiary or Step 5 level, a Board hearing officer,
serving pro tempore, sustained the grievance of A. Paul Lund ("Grievant") and
awarded him two separate retroactive salary step increases. The Board
reverses and vacates that decision.

A.

The Grievance.

A. Paul Lund filed a grievance statement under date of February 17, 1987.
His grievance stated:

On 2/21/87 a new surveyor was hired on our team. She is a
social worker (CSW) like myself and she is a Qualified
Mental Retardation Professional (QMRP) like myself. It is
my responsibility to train this person in her duties. I
have been at classification 23 step 2. The new QMRP was
hired at classification 23 step 4.

2.

Grievant1s requested remedy sought the following:

"I am seeking a minimum

3 step increase in my 23 classification."

Essentially Mr. Lund's complaint involved two issues. The first issue
concerns the hiring of a QMRP at grade 23 step 4 subsequent to Mr. Lund being
hired at grade 23 step 1 (thereafter advancing to step 2 following completion
of probation).

The result.of the difference in hiring salary rates was that

the more recently hired QMRP was being paid two steps above the Grievant, even
though she had been hired nearly eighteen months after the Grievant!s hiring.
The second issue is that Mr. Lund should have received a two-step increase
based upon an outstanding performance appraisal given to him.
a March 2, 1987 letter to his division director:

As he stated in

"On February 1986 I received

an outstanding annual evaluation which would merit a two-step increase in pay,
but was denied such because of the salary freeze."

Thereafter both

issues—the differentiation in the hiring rates between A. Paul Lund and Helen
Middleton (with whom he chose to compare salaries) and the award of only a
one-step increase following completion of a probationary term, rather than two
steps—were each presented as part of his grievance and responded to at steps
4 and 5 by the Division, together with no step increase being awarded during
February of FY 86-87.

B.

Grievant1s Employment History.

On August 26, 1985 Mr. Lund was hired as a Health Program Surveyor with
the Facility Survey Section, a unit within the Bureau of Medical Review,
Division of Health Care Financing, Utah Department of Health. Grievant
commenced employment at grade 23 step 1.
1

months

Upon completion of a standard six

probationary period, Grievant received a one-step salary increase.

For the period from November 26, 1985 through February 1986, Grievant was
evaluated as being "Above Standard."

(Mgt. Exh.5.) One year later Mr. Lund

was again evaluated in February 1987.

He was then rated for the period from

January 26, 1986 to February 25, 1987 as an "Outstanding" employee. (Mgt. Exh.

3.

6.)

Personnel Management Rules ("PPM Rules") for FY 86-87 precluded any

salary increases

for productivity or performance during that year.

Rules, section 7.d.(l)(a).)

(PPM

Grievant remained at step 2 of grade 23 in

February 1987, which caused him to initiate his grievance upon learning that
Ms. Middleton had been hired two steps above his salary rate despite his
longer service by eighteen months.

C. Issues.

The hearing officer at the Step 5 adjudicative proceeding determined the
issues to be two-fold:

1. Whether the Grievant has been improperly denied a
three-step salary increase or not?
2.

If so, what is the appropriate remedy?

The appropriate evidentiary standard of review at Step 5 was that of
substantial evidence, which is also the standard used by the Board in its
review.

Essentially, the Board must determine whether the hearing officer

made correct findings of fact, whether those facts have been correctly applied
to the law, and whether the Step 5 conclusions of law and decision are
accurate and correct based on the facts. In the instant case, the Board,
after reviewing the record finds that the hearing officer's Findings of Facts,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision ("Step 5 Decision") critically erred in three
of the four Conclusions in the Decision.

These errors are of sufficient

magnitude as to constitute reversible error.

II,

ANALYSIS OF THE STEP 5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Conclusion No. 1.

Conclusion No. 1 in the Step 5 Decision states:
H. Middleton!s recent hiring is irrelevant to Lundfs
grievance. Whatever irregularities in hiring her
that may have occurred should be addressed in some
other way than the scope of this decision.
This conclusion is correct: The hiring of Middleton at salary step 4 is
not related to whether the former applicable personnel rules had been properly
applied to Mr. Lund anent his hiring rate, his subsequent salary increase, or
any lack of salary increase. Mr. Lund does not have a valid cause of action
simply because another employee was hired at a later date and at a higher rate
when the then existing rules permitted such.

PPM Rule 7.c.(2) (effective July 1, 1985) applied to Mr. Lund when he was
hired in August 1985. The rule stated:

Individuals will typically be hired at the first step of
the approved range. Hiring above the first step of the
approved range may be permitted by the Director [of DMP]
only under unique conditions with documentation.
The implementation of the just-stated rule caused no harm to Mr. Lund—he
was hired according to a salary policy established by a lawfully promulgated
rule in force at the time of his hire.
In contrast, when Ms. Middleton was hired PPM Rule 7.c.(2) (effective July
1, 1986) had been amended to read:

Individuals will typically be hired at the first step of
the approved range. In the spirit of providing services to
agencies and allowing management to manage human resources
within their budget, agencies will have full responsibility
and authority to hire up to midpoint of the approved range
with the understanding the department head is held
responsible for providing funding and for preventing
inequities. (PPM Rule, section 7.c.(2), effective July 1,
1986.)
Thus DPM permitted different salary rates when Mr. Lund and Ms. Middleton
were each hired.

Each was hired pursuant to the rule in force at the time of

his or her hiring. Grievant was not harmed even though the rules permitted a
distinction of hiring rates.

Conclusion No, 2.

The hearing officer's second conclusion reads:

The confusion over what was or was not agency and state
policy on extra-step "productivity" increases by
supervisors Simpson, Elkins, and Lamanna, and the obvious
confusion engendered by M.S.C. Gatzemeyer's directive,
coupled with disparate treatment of Lund (under similar
circumstances), compared to employees in other units and
divisions by the Health Department by other supervisors,
suggests Lund was treated unfairly, arbitrarily and
capriciously. The Hearing Officer finds overwhelming
substantial evidence exists.
Beginning with Conclusion No. 2 the trier of facts has not accurately
applied the law, as based upon the given factual situation; and three
erroneous conclusions of law resulted.

The Step 5 Decision penalizes Divison

management for failing to award Grievant a two-step increase in February
1986.

The hearing officer opines that both "confusion" and "obvious

confusion" caused the Grievant not to receive an extra step increase in
February 1986. However, the responsibility of the finder of facts is to
accurately apply the applicable rules and law, which were in force during the
designated period, to the factual circumstances.

The applicable rule in force

when Grievant received his end of probation performance evaluation and
resultant salary increase was rule 7.d.(l)(b) of Personnel Management Rules
and Regulations, effective July 1, 1985.

(See Mgt. Exh. 7.)

The pertinent

provision of that rule states:

New employees shall serve a probationary period
from six months to eighteen months depending on
of position. A one or two step increase may be
employees successfully completing six months of
. . .(Emphasis added.)

6.

ranging
the class
granted to
probation .

In the above-quoted rule, agency management is granted discretion to award
either a one or two step salary increase. The just-quoted rule allowed
agency management to determine the number of step increases, either one or
two. Moreover, the wording specifies "may be granted."
such a salary increase is entirely discretionary.

Thus the granting of

Not only may either one or

two steps be given, but a careful reading of the rule quoted above allows for
situations where no increases need be offered.

Step increases were not even

required to be given due to the discretionary language of rule 7.d.(l)(b)
(1985 ed.).

It is the Board's determination that the receipt by Lund of only

a one-step increase, pursuant to PPM Rules 7.d.(l)(b) (1985 ed.), does not
necessarily or reasonably lead to the legal conclusion that he was "treated
unfairly, arbitrarily and capriciously" based on the factual findings.

The PPM Rules in force at the time of Mr. Lund1s probationary period
allowed agency management to consider its personal services budget and to
determine whether sufficient funds existed to grant one step increases, two
steps, or none. Even within a fiscal year, an imposed budget reduction might
find employees later in the fiscal year not receiving an increase that had
earlier been given to employees prior to an agency's fiscal reduction.
Conceivably some divisions might choose to grant only one-step increases,
awarding no two-step increases. The rule does not require all similarly
situated probationary emnployees to be treated equally or identically.

We

believe this to be intentional. Even if other employees in other divisions or
units of the Health Department received two-step awards, that does not require
the Health Care Financing Division to do likewise, unless directed to do so by
senior management.
Division that might
them.

Concededly, there may also be other units within the
possess funding for two-step increases, and so grant

In addition to the availability of funding, other business necessity

factors might well control or justify the specific number of steps (or none)
to be awarded.

The exercise of the discretion inherent in the wording of the

applicable rules does not constitute sufficient grounds for the conclusion
that Mr. Lund's treatment was arbitrary and capricious. The record contains
sufficient facts upon which a reasonable person could base the hiring and

7.

salary decisions made in this case.Mr. Lund was not harmed as a result of
receiving only a one-step increase when the then existing PPM Rules provided
for such.

There was no violation of a personnel rule with respect to Mr. Lund

receiving a one-step increase at the end of his probation, instead of two
steps where PPM Rules 7.d.(l) (b) provided managerial discretion to authorize
zero, one, or two steps, upon completion of probation. It was neither
arbitrary nor capricious to award Mr. Lund only one step in February 1986, in
light of the above-cited rules and circumstances.

Conclusion No. 3.

Conclusion No. 3 mistakenly concludes:

The policy of the Pepartment of Health was not clearly and
consistently enunciated to Lund!s supervisors in 1986 and
1987. This led to his supervisors not vigorously
championing extra-step increases, which would "almost
certainly have been supported by the Bureau of Personnel"
staff if such extra-step requests had been timely submitted
with justification. The justification was clearly
adequate, more than adequate, in Lund's case according to
testimony.
The above-quoted conclusion stands in error for the following reasons.
First, it was the "policy" (i.e. , rule) of the State expressed through PPM
Rules 7.d.(l)(b) that some discretion existed with respect to the number of
step increases awarded at the end of probation.

If the HCF Pivision

determined to limit such increases to one step that is not necessarily
arbitrary, capricious or even unfair if some reasonable basis exists for such
a decision.

The hearing officer has incorrectly substituted his own judgment

when the applicable rule allows agency descretion. Piscretion was division
management's prerogative so long as there is present some reasonable basis so
that application of the rule is found not to be arbitrary or capricious.

It should also be noted that if Mr. Lund objected to receiving a one-step
increase instead of two steps, his recourse was to then utilize the
Grievance Procedure. If he thought it to be unfair or in violation of the

8.

personnel rules to receive only a one-step salary increase, he should have
timely grieved the matter. Mr. Lund would have found out either on or shortly
after February 18, 1986 that he was going to be receiving only a one-step
increase, not two. Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-24 states:

1. No appeal shall be sumitted under this chapter unless
(a) it is submitted within 20 working days after the event
giving rise to the appeal or (b) within 20 working days
after the aggrieved employee has knowledge of the event
giving rise to the appeal.
2.
Notwithstanding subsection (l)(b), no employee may
submit an appeal more than one year after the event giving
rise to the appeal, nor does any person who has voluntarily
terminated his or her employment with the state have any
standing thereafter to submit an appeal.
As Mr. Lund had knowledge of the event giving rise to his grievance in
February 1986, he was untimely to initiate his grievance in February 1987.
The Step 5 Decision should have, recognized the untimeliness condition, but it
failed to address that fact.
The hearing officer also improperly attaches fault on Mr. Lund!s
supervisors for "not vigorously championing extra-step increases" which would
"almost certainly have been supported by the Bureau of Personnel." Such a
statement is wholly speculative and merely hypothetical.

It is the role and

responsibility of the hearing officer to make verifiable findings and legal
conclusions.

It is reversible error to render a decision based upon

speculation of what might have occurred in other circumstances. The hearing
officer should not attempt to second-guess agency management, as to what
course or decision management would take in an alternative situation, given
other circumstances.

Conclusion No. 4.

The fourth and final conclusion of the Step 5 Decision states:

9.

The granting of these retroactive two-step increases is not
to be a precedent in any other case where inequities
between salaries of new hires and incumbents exist—this
decision is based solely and exclusively upon confusion
over policy by supervisors in this one specific case and
the resulting inequitable treatment of Lund. He was
penalized because of managerial mistakes.
In this conclusion, the hearing examiner concludes that Lund "was
penalized because of managerial mistakes," due "exclusively upon confusion
over policy by supervisors" with "resulting inequitable treatment of Lund."

First it must be realized that Lund was not penalized by managerial
mistakes when first-line supervisors supported a two-step increase but
division management later restricted that increase to a one-step increase.
The hearing examiner failed to give proper weight or even to consider the then
existant PPM Rules 7.d. (l)(a), which states in pertinent part:

Productivity increases (reflective of the natural increase
in capability that occurs as employees learn their jobs) of
one or two steps shall be granted on an annual basis
following a six month probationary increase of one or two
steps until the market rate (midpoint of the salary range)
for the class has been achieved . . . .(Emphasis added).
Division management, as represented by Steven Gatzemeyer, Management
Services Coordinator, was holding probationary employees like Mr. Lund to a
one-step increase. That discretionary act was neither arbitrary nor
capricious.

It was a Division policy or practice during FY 85-86 which turned

out to have effected Mr. Lund. But such a practice did not violate existing
PPM Rules.

Conclusion No. A invokes a ground that is based primarily upon a human
value system—the matter of equity.

Specifically, the fourth conclusion makes

reference to "equities between salaries of new hires and incumbents" and the
alleged "inequitable treatment of Lund."

10.

The proper rules and laws must be carefully applied in the adjudications
at Step 5 hearings*

When and if cases are determined on the basis of "equity"

alone, they may not be dispositive to legally sound or logically reasoned
decision-making.

That principle was fixed in the previous case of Division of

Environmental Health vs. Jay B. Pitkin and Calvin K. Sudweeks (2 PRB 15,
1984).

In the just-cited case another hearing officer concluded that two

Health Department managers .were entitled to a two-step salary increase ffas a
matter of equity." (Ibid, p.8).

In Pitkin we stated:

"The Board finds that

the Hearing Officer's rationale of a two-step increase for Respondents, based
upon a 'matter of equity' is unwarranted . . . ." and vacated the Step 5
decision. Pitkin stated the Board's position on salary equity disputes in the
following words:

Equity in the legal meaning denotes 'the spirit and habit
of fairness, justice and right dealing which would regulate
the intercourse of men with men. (Black's Law Dictionary,
p. 484, 5th ed.) Equity alone, however, is not a
controlling principle upon which employment relations'
remedies are conditioned. (Ibid.)
Admittedly there will likely always exist salary inequities for some
employees given the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring
practices, its change in philosophies by different administrations and
department executives, its rather persistent changing of personnel rules in
order to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other germane
reasons that need not be included herein.

With respect to the assertion that the two-step increase would not be a
precedent, it is not necessary for the Board to determine the consequences of
such a decision because there are sufficient other grounds present to reverse
the decision.

However it can be noted that in attempting to resolve Mr. Lund's
complaint, the hearing officer would create an inequity of great magnitude.
The role of the hearing officer is to resolve grievances but in so doing he
must not impose his own variety of arbitrariness nor create inequities of his
own making.

11.

I n conclusion, t h e Board commends Mr. Lund f o r being recognized as an
outstanding and h i g h l y valued State employee by h i s immediate s u p e r v i s o r s .

We

wish Mr. Lund t o understand t h a t t h e Board's d e c i s i o n has been rendered only
on the basis of applicable conclusions of law, and i s not r e l a t e d t o Mr.
Lund's past o r present job performance — which was r e p o r t e d t o be o f good
quality.

No p a r t of t h i s d e c i s i o n should be viewed as d e t r a c t i n g i n any way

from Mr. Lund's f i n e r e c o r d .

DECISION:

The Division's appeal is affirmed. The Hearing Officer's determination in
the Step 5 Decision is hereby vacated.
DECISION UNANIMOUS.

D AT E D

this

cX ^

day of September, 1987.

BRUCE T. JOt^JES, Chairman
Utah PersonnelReTIew Board

ROBERT N, WHITE, A d m i n i s t r a t o r
Utah Personnel Review Board
Enc:

Mailing Certificate

Any appeal from t h e Board's decision must be made w i t h i n 20 calendar days
from issuance o f t h i s d e c i s i o n w i t h the D i s t r i c t Court f o r S a l t Lake County.
On appeal t o D i s t r i c t Court, the Board's f i n d i n g s of f a c t , i f
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, s h a l l be conclusive.
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended.

12.

supported by

Utah Code Ann. Section

Exhibit J

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
DECISION

C. C. PATEL,

AND

Grievant and Appellant,
v.

OPINION

:

DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH,
Agency and Respondent.

:
:
:

Case Nos. 9 CSRB/H.O. 122 Step 5)
4 CSRB 37
(Step 6)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate level review
of the above-captioned matter on November 12, 1991. The following Board members were
present at the hearing for oral argument and deliberation:

Bruce T. Jones, Chairman,

Jean M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig, Kathleen Hirabayashi, and Jose L. Trujillo. C. C. Patel
(Patel and Appellant) was present and represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, on
behalf of the Utah Public Employees' Association. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G.
Schwendiman represented the Division of Environmental Health (Division). Daniel J. Brentel,
Human Resource Manager, for the Division, was also present. A certified court reporter made
a verbatim record of the oral argument during this proceeding, which is commonly referred to
as a Step 6 appeal hearing under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code
Unannotated (Supplement 1991), Sections 67-19a-101 et seq.
I. AUTHORITY
The Board's authority is found at Sections 67-19a-101 through -407 of the just-mentioned
statutes. The CSRB's regulatory provisions or administrative rules are published in the Utah
Administrative Code at R140-1-1 et seq., and in the Board's Grievance and Appeal Procedures
Manual (1989 edition).
This case has proceeded properly and timely through the State's grievance procedures,
and the Board has assumed jurisdiction over the Appellant's appeal to Step 6 of those
procedures. The Step 6 or Board-level review constitutes the final step and is the highest level
of administrative review under the codified Grievance and Appeal Procedures, pursuant to

Sections 67-19a-202(l)(a), and -407, as well as constituting a final agency action under Section
63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Following oral argument, the Board
closed the record, and entered into deliberation and decision-making. Being apprised in the facts
and legal premises, the Board now makes and enters its factual findings, legal conclusions, and
decision,
n. ISSUES
A. Statement of Grievance and Remedy
Patd filed a statement of grievance on October 26, 1990. That grievance statement is
quite lengthy; therefore, only the following portions are quoted below.
I am bringing this action as a salary inequity grievance caused by
the hiring of a new employee at a salary rate higher than mine as
a current employee. . . .
Mr. John Kennington was hired in the Bureau of Water Pollution
Control, Division of Environmental Health, and started working as
[a] Level III Engineer on October 15, 1990. It is my
understanding that Mr. Kennington (new hired) will be making 9%
highgr salary than mine. I am now making $18.55 per hour as [a]
Level IV [EJngineer, which is a higher position than Level III
[Ejngineer. I worked in this Bureau for 7 years as [a] Level III
Engineer. I was then promoted on May 2, 1988, to [a] Level IV
Engineer position. I now have worked as [a] level IV Engineer in
this Bureau for 2 1/2 years.
Appellant stated the following as the remedy to his October 26, 1990, grievance:
1. That my salary be adjusted upward by 22% of my current
salary.
2. That this adjustment be made retroactive to October 15, 1990,
which is the hiring date of the new hired [i.e., John Kennington].
3. That the ensuring market adjustment in my salary resulting
from the [D]HRM's market survey be based upon this new salary,
and
4. [T]hat this grievance be treated separately from and without
prejudice to my April 25, 1990 grievance.

B. Issues Adjudicated at the Step 5/Evidentiarv Proceeding
The Notice of an Administrative Hearing Before the Hearing Officer, dated January 17,
1991, set forth the following two issues to be adjudicated: (1) Is the Grievant [Patel] entitled to
prevail on his salary issue grievance?, and (2) If so, what is the appropriate remedy? The CSRB
hearing officer re-worded the first issue in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision
and Order (Step 5 Decision) as follows: "Does a salary inequity exist between grievant and a
new hire?"
C. Step 5/Evidentiary Determination
The evidentiary trier of facts ultimately determined that Appellant's grievance was
without merit, and ordered that his grievance be dismissed. From the evidentiary decision
below, now comes Patel bringing his appeal on the Step 5 Decision to the Board at Step 6 of the
State's grievance procedure.
D. The Board's Scope of Review
R14Q-1-21 D sets forth the Board's scope of review and its standards of review, as
follows:
Standards of Review The board's decision shall be based upon the
following:
1. The board's appellate decisions shall be supported by credible
substantial evidence.
2. The board's standards of review consist of determining:
(a) whether the hearing officer's evidentiary decision was
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether that decision is
warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal;
and (c) whether the hearing officer's findings of fact and
conclusions of law are correct and accurate based upon the
evidence in the record.
E. Burden of Proof
Patel is the appealing party in this matter before the Board. Therefore, Patel shoulders
the burden of proof based upon the Board's just-stated standards of review.
m . STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Evidentiary Factual Findings
Neither party has disagreed with nor objected to the hearing officer's findings of fact.

Hence, those factual findings are adopted and incorporated herein in the same numerical
sequence, although with some slight change of syntax.
1. Appellant has been employed by the Division of Environmental Health's Bureau of
Water Pollution Control1 Bureau for 9,5 years.
2. Appellant has been classified as an Engineer IV since May 1988. Prior to that Patel
was an Engineer HI for six years.
3. Appellant has 20 years' experience as an engineer with ten years' experience as an
environmental engineer.
4. Appellant received his BS degree in 1962 in Civil Engineering; a Master's degree in
Civil Engineering-Hydraulics, in 1967; and a Master's degree in Civil Engineering-Sanitary, in
1971.
5. Patel's performance appraisals as an Engineer IV have been rated exceptional.
6. Patel is the only Engineer IV in the Bureau of Water Pollution Control.
7. Engineer IVs perform work similar to Engineer Ills except that the former must
possess a higher level of expertise and competence. An Engineer IV is similar to a lead
consultant who is able to move from project to project, based upon the stage of complexity of
the project and when technical expertise is necessary.
8. As an Engineer IV Patel is expected to perform at a higher level than an Engineer
HI by performing the following:
a. Independent research of current technologies in water pollution control;
b. Evaluate proposals received by management;
c. Interpret rules and policies for staff;
d. Keep abreast of trends to update staff;
e. Assist with proposals being recommended as projects to be undertaken.

9. On or about October 15, 1990, Kennington was hired as an Engineer III at the Bureau
of Water Pollution Control, Division of Environmental Health.
10. Upon being hired, Kennington's base salary was 95% of the maximum salary for
his pay grade (or pay range).
11. On October 15, 1990, Kennington earned approximately 9% more than Patel, i.e.,
$20.16 to Patel's $18.55 per hour.
12. On October 15, 1990, Kennington had less education and less total engineering
experience than did Patel. Kennington also lacked regulatory agency experience.
13. Appellant believes that the hiring of an Engineer III with less experience and
education at a higher pay rate created a salary inequity, and he pursued internal resolution
through the grievance procedure.
14. Patel met with Don Ostler, Director of the Bureau of Water Pollution Control.
Ostler met with Richard McDonald of the Utah Department of Human Resource Management
(DHRM). McDonald, according to Ostler, informed him that, generally, inequities in pay were
correctable, but only when comparing inequities within the same classification.
15. Upon Kennington's being hired, a comparison was made of the salaries of all
Engineer Ills within the [Division]2. A spreadsheet, with information obtained from the
Division, was generated to remedy any pay inequity that might result from Kennington's higher
starting pay rate. Only Engineer Ills were considered on the spread sheet, as they were all in
the same classification.
16. Kennington was hired at a salary rate above the midpoint of the Engineer III pay
range after DHRM approved the hiring action by the Division, and after exhaustive recruitment,
search and attempts to hire a qualified engineer at a lower pay rate.
17. Robert Haywood, Human Resource Director for the Department of Health [then the

Division's parent organizational unit], reviewed the register prior to an offer being made to
Kennington. Haywood telephoned Kennington in an attempt to convince Kennington to work
for the starting salary of an Engineer III, including benefits plus job security. Kennington
agreed to begin at a pay rate of $20.16 an hour, rather than $20.43 an hour. Haywood was
convinced that based upon the limited applicant pool, the experience of Kennington and the
nonsupervisory responsibility of the position that the offer was reasonable, given the market
salaries of comparable engineers.
18. Pursuant to policy, DHRM needed to approve the salary offer to Kennington because
the offered rate was above midpoint on the pay range. Felix McGowan of DHRM approved the
hiring offer on August 21, 1990, after he had reviewed all relevant data, including the spread
sheet comparison of the all Engineer Els in the Bureau.
19. On or about April 3, 1990, Richard McDonald, Director, Division of Compensation
and Classification, DHRM, issued a memorandum entitled "Compensation Issues." (See Grvt.
Exht. 5.)
20. On or about August 8, 1990, Earl J. Banner, then Executive Director, DHRM,
wrote to Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director, Department of Health. In correspondence,
Banner referenced McDonald's memorandum of April 3, 1990, and replied to specific questions
from Dr. Dandoy regarding pay inequities and special pay adjustments. (See Grvt. Exht. 9.)
21. Patel affirms that he is not alleging that an inequity in salary exists upon an illegal
discriminatory hiring practice nor based upon Patel's race, color, national origin, sex, religion,
creed, age, disability, or his political affiliation.
B. The Board's Factual Findings
The Board makes and enters the following findings of fact based upon the record below:
1. The Division's higher rate of pay offered to Kennington was based upon a rationale

justification relating to (a) an extremely lengthy recruiting period which began in November
1989 and ended with Kennington's hiring in October 1990 (RUPP, T. p. I l l ; OSTLER, T. p.
65; HAYWOOD, T. p. 152-53), (b) all the Engineer III candidates who qualified for the
position (eventually filled by Kennington) were then earning more money in the private sector
than what was being offered to any of the candidates for the State position. (RUPP, T. p. 11112.)
2. The Division's final salary offer to Kennington was equal to that being paid to another
Engineer HI (Tim Pine) who had quite similar qualifications to Kennington's. Of 20 Engineer
Ills in the Division, three had higher salary rates than Kennington's, 16 were paid at a lesser
pay rate, with Kennington's pay rate matched to Tim Pine's based upon comparable
qualifications. (RUPP, T. p. 112; Agency Exht. 7.)
3.

The Division relied upon market data factors to hire Kennington and fill the

long-standing, vacant Engineer position at a salary of $20.16. The salary offer to Kennington
was wholly market-driven. (HAYWOOD, T. pp. 150, 161, 164, 165, 169, 192; RUPP, T. pp.
111-12; McDONALD, T. p. 143-44; CLAWSON, T. p. 210-11; Agency Exht. 7.)

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Board and its hearing officers lack jurisdiction over classification complaints
pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated §67-19-31(1) and R140-1-1.
2. The Board has jurisdiction over issues and disputes involving wages, salary matters,
and pay complaints generally, as well as over allegations of violations of personnel rules (§6719a-202(l)(a)).
3. DHRM has sole direct responsibility and authority to design and administer both the
State's pay plan and the State's classification system (§67-19-8(1) and (2)).

These

responsibilities and functions may not be delegated or contracted to any other State agency.
4. §67-19-12(3) specifies DHRM's role in establishing the State's position classification
plan. §67-19-8(4) specifies DHRM's role in developing, adopting, and implementing the State's
pay plans for all positions in the classified service.
5. §67-19-6(l)(d) authorizes DHRM to develop, implement and administer a a statewide
program of personnel management," including the adopting of rules for personnel management
(§67-19-6(l)(a) and (d)).
6. The personnel management rules by DHRM which are applicable to this case are
Human Resource Management Rules (July 1, 1990).
7. DHRM R468-7-2 broadly allocates all classified positions to one of the State's several
pay plans: "Each classification of positions [sic] shall be assigned to a salary range on the pay
plan . . . ."
8. R468-7-2.(l) states:
Each classification [of position] shall be assigned [to] a salary
range which takes into consideration the classification plan, market
and other data. Market research shall be carried out by DHRM
through comprehensive labor market surveys and surveys prompted
by analysis of turnover, vacancy rates and recruitment indicators.
9. R468-7-3.(2) states:
Individuals will typically be appointed at the minimum pay [rate]
of the approved [salary] range. However, agencies have full
responsibility and authority at their discretion to hire up to [the]
midpoint of the approved range. Hiring above the minimum [rate]
of the range shall not be used as justification to increase the salary
[rates] of current encumbents [sic] [,] except where approved
market data supports such increases.
It has not been shown that the just-stated rule was abused or violated by the Division
inasmuch as none of the 20 Engineer III incumbents had their salary changed as a result of
Kennington's being hired.
10. R468-7-2.(l) states that each classification of position takes into consideration salary
market data, salary surveys, and such relevant hiring information as turnover rates, position

vacancy rates, and other recruitment factors. Such market conditions may be relevant to justify
the higher pay rate for a new level III appointee over a longer term level IV incumbent (or in
comparison to other level Ills).
11. In Patel's case, a pay differential or pay discrepancy does not necessarily constitute
a pay equity situation even though a more recently hired employee's pay rate exceeds that of a
longer service employee (i.e., Patel) provided there is adequate justification and a fully
supportable rationale that does not offend.

Certainly any such justification may not be based

upon such clearly impermissible factors as race, sex, color, national origin, age (40 years and
above), religion, or disability.
12. The pay differential or salary discrepancy between Kennington and Patel does not
constitute a pay inequity to the latter: (a) where the market conditions require the Division's
year-long recruiting efforts, (b) where several offers that are extended to other individuals are
turned down due to higher salary expectations, and (c) where an agency has to offer an
exceptional above midpoint pay rate—together with the required approval of DHRM--in order
to fill a critical position with a qualified candidate. These kinds of market condition factors do
not rise to the level of pay inequity or pay discrimination.
13. Where a grievant alleges a discriminatory pay practice, the burden of proof is on
the grievant to compare his or her pay rate with that of the appropriate group for comparison
purposes.
14.

In the instant matter, Appellant has not shown that his pay rate vis-a-vis

Kennington's constitutes a pay rate inequity, an unlawful discriminatory pay practice, or an
improper or abusive pay differential or discrepancy given the facts and circumstances that
required the Division to rely upon then current salary market data and conditions to set an
exceptional pay rate for Kennington. The Board further concludes that the Division's reliance
upon salary market data and conditions is fully supportable, reasonable in the circumstance, and
wholly justifiable. Therefore, it is not necessary to enter into comparisons between the pay rates
of Engineer m versus Engineer IV position titles and salary (grade) ranges at this time.

V. DISCUSSION
There is no factual dispute regarding the following points: (1) that Kennington as the
more recently hired employee was employed as an Engineer III, whereas Patel is an Engineer
IV, (2) that Kennington was hired on the Engineer III salary range but at a rate of nearly 95%

of that range, (3) that Kennington's pay rate as an Engineer III exceeded Patel's rate as an
Engineer IV, (4) that Patel generally has more relevant education, work experience, and
governmental service than Kennington, (5) that Kennington's pay rate at $20.16 is approximately
nine percent above Patel's rate at $18.55, although Patel presently has the opportunity to reach
a greater maximum salary rate due to being on a higher salary (grade) range, (6) that Patel avers
that a pay inequity exists between his salary and Kennington's, (7) that Patel argues against
making a distinction in position classification (i.e., Engineer III as opposed to Engineer IV), but
instead avers that the duties and responsibilities of these two incumbents' are so similar that job
comparability exists between Kennington's and Patel's respective positions, and (8) that the
Division conducted a spread sheet analysis of all 20 Engineer Ills in the Division (which ranked
three incumbents at a higher pay rate than Kennington, 16 below him, and one at a matching
pay rate), although no analysis was performed regarding Patel's pay rate as Engineer IV with
Kennington's hiring rate as an Engineer III.
The evidentiary decision of the hearing officer concluded that Patel's grievance lacked
merit because Patel and Kennington were in different "classifications." The hearing officer
stated:
The pay range should reflect equal pay for equal work. (See UCA
67-19-12(4).) The concept of equal pay for equal work is confined
to employees within the same classification. Equal pay is not, as
Mr. Patel argues, a generic concept comparing duties in different
classifications. Mr. Patel is insured [of] equal pay for equal work
within his classification. (Emphasis added.)
The hearing officer further concluded that Engineers at levels I, II, III, and IV comprise a class
series. Even though Appellant argued below that some State agencies allow equitable salary
adjustments based upon class series, the Step 5 Decision held that "classification inequity is and
has been the determining factor for salary adjustments" within this Division. According to the
CSRB hearing officer, if other departments provide salary adjustments based upon a class series,
then it is DHRM's (and not this Division's) role to ensure accurate comparisons of class series.
Thus, DHRM and not this Division should carry out such comparisons, concluded the trier of
facts. The evidentiary trier essayed that a DHRM, it appears in this case, has established a
policy of allowing equitable adjustment only to correct inequities within a classification.
Agencies doing otherwise may be outside their scope of authority." (Step 5 Decision, p. 10.)
The Board, however, has chosen to make a more reserved conclusion regarding whether

employees on different salary ranges and with differing job titles (such as Engineers III and IV)
in the same class series may compare their individual pay rates under the aegis of pay inequity
claims or pay discrepancy grievances with other employees. The Board concludes that it is not
necessary to reach such a conclusion, given the circumstances of this case.
As the Paid case turns on the rational justification of salary market data and conditions,
including an exceptionally long position vacancy rate, it is not necessary to decide at this time
whether grievants with differing job titles (such as Engineers III and IV) may compare
themselves with employees on other salary ranges as Mr. Patel has chosen to do.
Notwithstanding, the burden of proof remains with the aggrieved employee or group of
employees to compare their salary or pay rates with the appropriate job title and salary range
in order to determine if an inequity exists in light of the Board's Conclusions of Law and
discussion contained herein.
Previously the Board has noted that not all employees with the same job title are paid at
the same rate. The State's current pay plans do not contemplate identical pay rates for similarly
situated employees because variable factors foster pay rate differences. Variations in employees'
salaries result from such factors and conditions as promotions, career mobility assignments,
varying amounts of merit money increases, legislatively-imposed Statewide salary freezes, cost
of living adjustments (COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' entry rates (creating salary
compression), length of service, long-term leaves of absence, interrupted service and rehirings,
reassignments, disciplinary penalties, and other job-related factors. In prior decisions we have
noted some of these distinctions and reasons for differing pay rates between employees due in
part to "the size of the State's work force, its turnover and hiring practices, its change in
philosophies by different administrations and department executives, its rather persistent
changing of personnel rules to adapt to changing conditions and exigencies, and for other
germane reasons that need not be included herein." A. Paul Lund v. Division of Health Care
Financing, 3 PRB 24, at 11 (1987). In that decision, the Board held that the several divisions
within the same department might—for justifiable reasons, such as budgetary or business
necessity—offer differing salary increases among employees of the several divisions or even
within the same division but at different times during the fiscal year based upon allocation of
funding and available budget. Salary application to given situations should be reviewed on the
basis of existing rules, where applicable use of proper discretion, application of consistency, and
availability of funding, among other relevant factors, {lbid.)

Inasmuch as the State's compensation system has been set up by the Legislature to
compare its "comparability of state salaries to wages and salaries paid by private enterprise and
other public employment for similar work" (§67-19-12(4)(b)(ii)), it is not unreasonable to believe
that some stresses and strains will result on occasion concerning salary comparisons between
certain employees. That, however, is why this Board exists: to review and adjudicate those
matters brought through the grievance procedure, including disputes and complaints anent salary
and wages.
Finally, while Mr. Patel may continue to feel that an unfairness exists regarding the
higher pay rate offered to Kennington at the latter's hiring, Patel is not without certain
advantages and benefits which he has accrued over his 9.5 years with the Division. Patel enjoys
9.5 years of investment with the State's retirement program compared with Kennington's zero
investment upon the latter's commencement with the State. Appellant's accrual rates for earning
sick leave and annual leave are much more than Kennington's. In general, Patel has benefited
from his participation in the State's health and welfare plans for nearly one decade while
Kennington just began as a new employee in October 1990. The State's employer-paid health
and welfare plans, including annual leave and sick leave, translate into a substantial monetary
value which Patel has benefited from for nearly a decade compared with Kennington's lack of
such past advantages. Importantly, Appellant also has an opportunity to reach a greater
maximum salary rate due to being on a higher salary (grade) range as an Engineer IV.
Kennington's salary progress will be restricted as an Engineer III before Patel's. In sum, while
market conditions served to justify a higher starting salary for Kennington, which even exceeded
Patel's pay rate as a long-term and higher level employee, there is a monetary off-set in that
Patel has benefited by 9.5 years of steady State employment, progression of salary and
promotion, participation in quite favorable health and welfare plans, and nearly a decade's
accumulation and accrual of sick leave and annual leave, and such other benefits as eleven paid
holidays per year not available in the private sector.

VI. DECISION
The appeal is denied. The evidentiary decision at Step 5 is affirmed.

DECISION UNANIMOUS.
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Board Member
David M. Hilbig, SPHR, Board Member
Kathleen Hirabayashi, Board Member
Dr. Jose L. Trujillo, Board Member

DATED this^- 13 day o L A l r V ^ - w 4 ^ 7 1991.

Robert N. White
Administrator
Utah Career Service Review Board

ENDNOTES
1. The 1991 General Session of the Utah Legislature enacted legislation which changed the
Division of Environmental Health to the Utah Department of Environmental Quality effective
July 1, 1991. Hence, the former Bureau of Water Pollution control then became the Division
of Water Quality. See Utah Code Unannotated §§19-1-101 et seq.
2. The Step 5 Decision states that the spread sheet was performed within the Bureau of Water
Pollution Control on all Engineer Ills. However, the record is corrected to read that the spread
sheet analysis on all Engineer Ills was at the Division level, not just the Bureau level.

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R140-1-21 J and Utah Code
Unannotated Section 67-46b-13.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code Unannotated
Section 67-46b-14.
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